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 1 
Summary 
Exhaustion of rights is of critical importance for the free transfer of goods and as 
such, the functioning of any market economy. Exhaustion of rights is the 
consumption of rights in intellectual property subject matter as a consequence of 
the legitimate transfer of title in the tangible article that incorporates or bears the 
intellectual property in question. The principles of the exhaustion doctrine are still 
unsettled in many jurisdictions, including the EU. In the U.S., the Federal Circuit 
decided a case in 1992 where it argued an alternative rationale to the doctrine and 
upheld post–sale restrictions as preserving patent rights. The case has not been 
explicitly overruled and there are, as a result, two competing rationales behind the 
U.S. exhaustion doctrine. Part of the thesis is dedicated to the EU view on this 
alternative rationale.   
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the enforceability and effect of 
post–sale restrictions in relation to exhaustion of intellectual property rights and 
competition law in the EU, applying a law and economics perspective. The main 
focus has been to find whether a holder of an intellectual property right, by using 
post–sale restrictions, may control when exhaustion occurs, and also if post–sale 
restrictions preserve control over the sold goods by means of contract law. The 
analysis has included the application of traditional deductive legal method to 
construe current law in the EU and the U.S.. A comparison between the two 
territories focuses on the underlying rationale of the U.S. conditional sale doctrine 
that allows the intellectual property holder to preserve rights by post–sale 
restrictions and how this doctrine would be met if it surfaced in the EU. Another 
comparative issue discussed is the two jurisdictions’ different views on the capability 
of a licensee to make an exhausting sale. In addition, a law and economics 
perspective has been added to the analysis of EU law, with a critical view of the 
design of the exhaustion doctrine and what implications would arise in relation to 
the use of post–sale restrictions.  
 
The analysis construes the examination of the exhaustion doctrine elements and to 
what extend the proprietor may assert control over exhaustion or, following 
exhaustion, the good. The conclusion is that the proprietor has limited possibilities 
to control the occurrence of exhaustion but that he is more likely to succeed 
asserting control under contract law, although at risk of unenforceability defenses. 
Furthermore, the comparison finds that the CJEU is not likely to accept the 
alternative exhaustion rationale offered in the U.S. by the Federal Circuit, and that 
the EU attitude towards licensees making exhausting sales is better balanced than 
the U.S.’ view because this attitude does not give incentive to structure transactions 
with intermediaries (to contract around exhaustion), which is also more 
economically efficient. Economic efficiency is found to benefit from intellectual 
property rights under the dynamic efficiency theory but only if they are properly 
limited so that their negative effects on the market, as market failures, are 
minimized. Exhaustion is an important instrument in promoting economic 
efficiency by limiting these negative consequences. This effect of exhaustion could 
be diminished if post–sale restrictions were allowed to dispose of it.  
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Sammanfattning 
Konsumtion av rättigheter är en mycket viktig princip för den fria rörligheten för 
varor och även för en fungerande marknadsekonomi. Konsumtion innebär att 
immateriella rättigheter i ett fysiskt exemplar konsumeras vid en överlåtelse av 
äganderätten till exemplaret som innehåller eller bär på rättigheten. I många 
jurisdiktioner är principens olika rekvisit ännu inte klarlagda. Amerikanska Federal 
Circuit resonerade i ett rättsfall 1992 kring en alternativ grund för konsumtion där 
domstolen även avgjorde fallet till förmån för förbehåll som begränsade 
konsumtionen av rättigheter. Rättsfallet har inte blivit uttryckligen emotsagt av 
Supreme Court och som en följd finns nu två alternativa grunder till den 
amerikanska konsumtionsprincipen. Delar av uppsatsen behandlar EUs inställning 
till denna alternativa grund.  
 
Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka förbehålls giltighet och effekt i relation till 
konsumtion av immaterialrättigheter och konkurrensrätt i EU utifrån ett 
rättsekonomiskt perspektiv. Fokus har legat på att utreda huruvida en innehavare 
av en immaterialrätt kan kontrollera vid vilken tidpunkt konsumtion inträffar och, 
om inte, huruvida en sådan innehavare kan använda sig av avtalsrätt för att få den 
andra avtalsparten att agera på ett visst vis. Analysen innefattar resultatet av 
framställningen avseende EU–rätt och amerikansk rätt. De båda jurisdiktionerna 
jämförs med fokus på argument underliggande den amerikanska ”the conditional 
sale doctrine” som tillåter en innehavare av immaterialrätt att behålla vissa 
rättigheter genom förbehåll och hur dessa argument skulle mottas i EU. De två 
jurisdiktionernas olika inställning till huruvida en licenstagare kan göra en 
rättighetsutsläckande försäljning är också föremål för jämförelse. Slutligen har ett 
rättsekonomiskt perspektiv anlagts vid analysen av den EU–rättsliga regleringen. 
Perspektivet har särskilt fokus på uppbyggnaden av konsumtionsprincipen och vilka 
följder som kan anas i det fall man skulle tillåta förbehåll av nämnt slag. 
 
Analysen tolkar framställningen av konsumtionsprincipens rekvisit och i vilken 
utsträckning innehavaren av immaterialrätten kan utöva kontroll över när 
konsumtion ska ske, eller, över det sålda föremålet. Slutsatsen är att det finns små 
möjligheter för innehavaren att utöva kontroll över när konsumtion ska ske, och att 
innehavaren eventuellt kan nå större framgång med kontroll genom ett 
avtalsförhållande förutsatt att inga ogiltighetsgrunder föreligger. En jämförelse visar 
att EU–domstolen troligtvis inte skulle godta den alternativa grunden för 
konsumtionsprincipen som förespråkas av amerikanska Federal Circuit. I min 
mening är EU:s attityd mot att en licenstagare gör konsumtionsgrundande akter att 
föredra eftersom den inte uppmuntrar till komplexa avtalsförhållanden endast för 
att kringgå konsumtion. Slutligen främjas ekonomisk effektivitet av 
immaterialrätter enligt den dynamiska effektivitetsteorin, men endast om 
rättigheterna begränsas så att deras negativa effekter minimeras. Konsumtion är ett 
viktigt instrument för denna begränsning och dess verkan skulle kunna minskas 
eller sättas ur spel ifall förbehåll tilläts att förfoga över konsumtionen. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development recently 
published a paper presenting national experiences of the implementation of 
exhaustion policies.1 In the paper’s foreword, exhaustion is said to be of critical 
importance for the free transfer of goods and as such, the functioning of any 
market economy. 2  Exhaustion of rights means the consumption of rights in 
intellectual property (“IP”) subject matter as a consequence of the legitimate 
transfer of title in the tangible article that incorporates or bears the intellectual 
property right (“IPR”) in question.3 It acts as a border marker of IPRs and defines 
the scope of them by terminating the right holder’s control over a good.  
 
There are other legal institutions with containing effects on IPRs, including 
competition laws and public policies. However, these institutions are applicable to 
all activities on the market and not only the exercise of IPRs. Exhaustion is not 
triggered by IPRs having an anti–competitive effect per se but by certain elements 
being at hand. The precise details of the exhaustion doctrine are still unsettled in 
most jurisdictions, including the European Union (“EU”) and the United States 
(“U.S.”) The consideration (or not) of the right holder’s intent as an element of 
exhaustion is no exception. Although an important topic under EU law as regarded 
under the exhaustion element of consent, it has received far more attention in the 
U.S. in relation to the conditional sale doctrine that allows the proprietor to limit 
exhaustion by means of post–sale restrictions. 
 
Exhaustion is commonly triggered by a good incorporating an IPR being “placed on 
the market”, also referred to as a “first sale”. Implied in this account of events is the 
intent of the right holder to agree to the termination of control by renouncement 
of the exclusive rights. Although, the right holder will often find it more attractive 
to remain in control and will therefore resort to certain restricting practices. 
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis examines the enforceability and effect of post–sale restrictions in 
relation to exhaustion of IPRs and competition law in the EU, applying a law and 
economics perspective. The main focus will lie on whether an IPR holder using 
                                                
1 Ghosh, Shubha, The Implementation of Exhaustion Policies: Lessons from national experiences, ICTSD 
Programme on innovation, Technology and Intellectual Property, Issue Paper No. 40, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2013. 
2 Ghosh, p. v. 
3 WIPO, p. 4. 
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post–sale restrictions may control when exhaustion occurs, and also if post–sale 
restrictions preserve control over the sold goods by means of contract law.  
1.3 Method and Materials 
1.3.1 Theoretic Background 
Traditional deductive legal method has been applied to construe current law in 
both the EU and the U.S.. The method is based on the use of sources of law and its 
practice embraces the interpretation of these sources within their hierarchy so as to 
draw conclusions on what the applicable law is and how it applies to a given issue.4 
 
A comparison with the perspective on the conditional sale and first sale doctrine in 
U.S. patent law will lend arguments to my analysis where the arguments will 
problematize potential developments in the EU. The aim of the comparative study 
is to focus on the rules’ efficiency in relation to their policy backgrounds.  
 
Finally, I adopt a law and economics perspective in my analysis, so as to evaluate my 
findings concerning the EU approach. The perspective seeks to critically view 
exhaustion and post–sale restrictions in light of economic efficiency and the 
realization of the single market. In short, law and economics is a method of analysis 
where the effects of law are described in economic terms. As such, it is a useful tool 
to evaluate law and policy.5 Economic analysis predicts what alternative will be the 
most economically efficient in reaching a set goal. The economic method assumes a 
state of general equilibrium. At this point, the benefit to society is greatest as there is 
allocative and productive efficiency; the marginal cost for producing the last unit is 
equal to the price that a consumer is willing to pay for it.6 General equilibrium 
builds on utility–maximizing consumers and profit–maximizing companies acting 
in a market where competitive forces lead to the equality of marginal benefit and 
marginal cost.7 Perfect competition on the market is essential for the creation of 
general equilibrium and so–called market failures may prevent this from occurring: 
monopolies and market power, externalities, public goods and severe information 
asymmetries.8 The legal system thus has a central role in removing market failures to 
make the market more economically efficient. 9  The legal system may remove 
insecurities in transactions, and thereby transaction costs, by implementing rules 
that allocate risks or ownership of property.10 Ownership is essential to efficient 
investments and use of resources and insecurities regarding the ownership of an 
item will lessen the incentive to engage in transactions and also incur increased 
transaction costs.11  
                                                
4 See as described by Korling & Zamboni, p. 21 ff. 
5 Cooter & Ulen, p. 4. 
6 Dahlman, Glader, & Reidhav, p. 136. 
7 Cooter & Ulen, p. 43. 
8 Id., p. 43 ff. 
9 Dahlman, Glader, & Reidhav, p. 63. 
10 Id., p. 83 f. 
11 Id., p. 158.  
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In the context of this thesis’ topic, it should be noted that there is an alternative to 
the traditional static economic efficiency theory, the dynamic economic efficiency 
theory. The dynamic efficiency theory builds on economic efficiency measured as 
based on pricing, supply and demand as well as the generation of and competition 
by new technology. 12  In contrast to the static efficiency theory, the dynamic 
efficiency theory does not have a clear market model (such as general equilibrium) 
for efficiency. 13  A point of great difference between the two theories is the 
presumption under dynamic efficiency theory that the market will benefit from 
some inefficiency in competition if the inefficiency is due to the promotion of 
technological development, as it has a potential that often outweighs the benefit of 
perfect competition.14 IPRs are in accordance with the dynamic efficiency theory 
beneficial to the market, but at the same time a market failure in the form of a 
monopoly or market power.15 It is critical to the efficiency of the market that a 
balance is struck where the benefits of IPRs outweigh their negative effects on the 
market. 
1.3.2 European Union Law 
In this thesis, EU law is treated as an autonomous legal system and no regard is 
made to procedural issues relating to the treatment or effect of EU law in the 
member states. The basic assumption is made that what is expressed by EU law is 
implemented and applied in the member states. The examination of EU law covers 
primary sources, secondary sources and supplementary sources. Relevant rules are 
found primarily in case law, construing the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) as well as in 
Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the member states relating to 
trademarks and Regulation 207/2009 on the Community trademark, that in turn 
has been commented in official documents originating with the EU institutions 
and interpreted in case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”).  
 
The supranational nature of EU law generates legal materials from all member 
states. I have concentrated my efforts to searching materials on the specific issue of 
post–sale restrictions and exhaustion. As a result, the use of sources outlining the 
general framework is limited to treatises accessible in Sweden, such as Marianne 
Levin’s work from 2011.16 Regarding specific issues, much has been written on 
exhaustion in regards to EU free movement, competition law, and parallel trade. 
Frequent commenters on these issues are Professors Hans Henrik Lidgard, Jens 
Schovsbo, Ole–Andreas Rognstad, Stefan Enchelmaier and Dr. Christopher 
Stothers (although not all cited in this thesis). EU treatment of restrictions imposed 
                                                
12 Dahlman, Glader, & Reidhav, p. 139 ff. 
13 Id., p. 140. 
14 Id., p. 141. 
15 See id., p. 169. 
16  Levin, Marianne, Lärobok i immaterialrätt: upphovsrätt, patenträtt, mönsterrätt, känneteckensrätt i 
Sverige, EU och internationellt, 10., [uppdaterade] uppl., Norstedts juridik, Stockholm, 2011. 
 8 
by IPR holders is mainly commented on in relation to licensing and specifically in 
relation to the so–called block exemptions, see for example Lidgard’s Licensavtal i 
EU: kommentar till kommissionens förordning 240/96 om tillämpning av Romfördragets 
artikel 85.3 på vissa grupper av avtal om tekniköverföring, 1. uppl., Publica, Stockholm, 
1997, and more recently Gölstam, cited in the bibliography. These scholarly 
debates are important inspirations for this examination. 
1.3.3 United States’ Law 
Concerning U.S. law, the examination covers legislation and case law, i.e. primary 
sources, as well as secondary sources including law reviews, treatises and articles. 
The primary sources’ authority can be either mandatory or persuasive, whereas 
secondary sources can only hold persuasive authority. Rules relevant for this thesis 
are found in statutes (also called “black letter law”) and common law, as defined in 
case law. The statutory rules relevant for the U.S. perspective are mainly found in 
the Patent Act17 and also state contract law. Regarding courts’ interpretation of 
these rules as well as relevant common law, federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent matters. Cases may be brought in district court and any 
appeal is under the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals, Federal 
Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”), whose judgments may be appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Accordingly, this thesis regards cases where judgment has been 
made by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit.  
 
Secondary sources are plentiful and readily available, as American legal academics 
and professionals frequently comment different legal issues and most sources are 
available online through archival, legal websites, such as Westlaw, LexisNexis and 
Heinonline. Another online source is the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 
where writers may publish their materials. Articles are by nature limited in scope to 
specific legal issues and may be descriptive, prescriptive or both, depending on the 
purpose and intended reader. Treatises, in contrast, are usually comprehensive and 
aspire to give an overview and structure to a legal framework in a descriptive 
manner.  
1.4 Delimitations 
Due to time and space constraints, all IPRs are not covered in the thesis. The EU 
exhaustion doctrine has grown largely within trademark law and as a consequence, 
much of the EU materials presented relate to trademark law. However, focus is also 
put on patent law where harmonizing law is in the EU pipeline. Even though the 
exhaustion rules are common for all “contracting parties” (including EEA 
countries), only CJEU case law is examined. The term “Community” is used 
throughout the paper as describing the geographical area in which exhaustion 
occurs, including the EEA countries. The presentation of U.S. law, providing a 
comparative perspective, is limited to patent law. The selection of cases is not 
comprehensive but rather made with the intent to illustrate the content of the 
                                                
17 United States Code Title 35. 
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elements. Both the EU and U.S. are signers to several international treaties of 
which none will be regarded as they do not regulate the material content of 
exhaustion. Finally, the economic perspective of this thesis is limited to the balance 
of IPR benefits and negative effects to the market. I aim to critically view the 
exhaustion rules from an economic efficiency point of view.  
1.5 Disposition 
As a border marker of IPRs, exhaustion is defined by policy considerations 
underlying the IPRs that it limits. Introducing the issue at hand, an outline 
introducing IPR policy considerations – together with an overview of restrictions 
employed as a means to extend IPR holders’ control over articles sold – is provided 
in chapter two of the thesis. Chapters three and four, pertaining to the EU’s and 
the U.S.’s applicable laws, make up the central part of this thesis. The chapters 
present (1) the elements of exhaustion as defined and interpreted, and (2) the 
treatment of post–sale restrictions in relation to IP in the jurisdiction. In chapter 
four, presenting U.S. law, emphasis will be added to supporting arguments and 
criticism of the enforcement of restrictions. The thesis concludes with my 
reflections. In turn, reflections will be presented on the EU and U.S. chapters. 
Next, a discussion will follow on the developments in the U.S. from an EU context; 
are there lessons to be learned? Thereafter, the economic efficiency of the EU 
model is assessed. Finally, there is a short summary of my conclusions.  
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2 Legal Context 
2.1 Intellectual Property Law 
2.1.1 Purpose 
Protection for IPRs is motivated by considerations whereby society creates incentive 
for investments in creativity and development. In general, the idea is that creative 
expressions and inventions should be within the public domain for the benefit of 
development and society but that a lack of protection for them would have a 
deterring effect on those who are considering investment of time and capital into 
developing these assets. The protection should be balanced, so as to provide for the 
dissemination of ideas and innovations at the same time as to reward the inventor. 
While IPRs affect competition in a negative way by providing a monopoly–like 
position (i.e. a market failure), according to the theory of dynamic efficiency they 
also support competition as an instrument to drive development and further 
inventive activities.18 
 
Generally, IPRs are granted nationally and provide certain exclusive rights for the 
proprietor, allowing him or her to prevent others from exploiting their work. The 
exclusive rights enable the proprietor to control, among other things, the 
distribution and use of the objects in which the IPR is incorporated. The exclusive 
rights are provided in order to protect the IPR holder from other’s free–riding on 
the inventive activity and thereby allowing the IPR holder to regain the investment 
spent on research and development of the IPR. Control over distribution and use 
gives the IPR holder an advantage over other potential distributors of the same 
product. 
2.1.2 In Relation to Trade 
Plenty of efforts have been made on an international level to ease international 
trade and conditions for goods protected by IPRs; examples include harmonizing 
minimum levels of protection through the Paris Convention, the Berne 
Convention and the Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) and offering procedural benefits through both the European 
Patent Convention (“EPC”) and the Patent Cooperation Treaty to lessen the 
economic burden on the inventor seeking protection in several jurisdictions. The 
TRIPS agreement states that IPR protection should contribute to technological 
innovation and the transfer of technology so that both producers and users should 
benefit, and also that economic and social welfare should be enhanced.19 However, 
the limitations to IPRs have not been a subject of cooperation; in the TRIPS 
                                                
18 Bernitz et al., p. 335. 
19 TRIPS Article 7. 
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agreement, the rule of exhaustion is explicitly excepted from the dispute resolution 
framework put into place to guarantee the minimum rights.20  
 
Exhaustion of rights means the consumption of rights in IP subject matter, as a 
consequence of the legitimate transfer of title in the tangible article that 
incorporates or bears the IPR in question.21 In the U.S., the doctrine is also 
commonly referred to as the “first sale” doctrine. Exhaustion of rights is critical to 
the functioning of any market economy because it permits the free transfer of 
goods.22 If there was no exhaustion of rights, the consequence would be that the 
IPR holder could sue purchasers, and any subsequent purchasers, for infringement 
by using or selling the object incorporating the IPR.  
2.1.3 Structure in the EU and the U.S. 
In the EU, all member states have their own independent intellectual property laws. 
The EU has instituted “umbrella” laws, harmonizing the rules applicable, so as to 
further the internal market. The EU divides IPRs into industrial property rights 
including patents, trademarks, designs, and copyright and neighboring rights. 
Copyright and neighboring rights stand out against other IPRs due to the 
recognition of moral rights, as articulated in, for example, Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention. IPRs are protected fundamental rights under Article 17 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.23 Although IPRs were not intended 
to be regulated by the EU at the outset, see TFEU Article 345, they were not 
immune to other Community regulations such as the rules regarding free 
movement and competition law. The monopolies created are balanced by being 
restricted in time and scope and are subject to several limitations – one being 
exhaustion of rights.  
 
U.S. intellectual property law is federal law.24 Grounds for IPR protection are found 
in the Constitution. IPRs are not divided into industrial property rights, copyright 
and neighboring rights as in the EU but all IPRs fall under the term “Intellectual 
Property”. In the following, ”IPRs” will be used as a collective term for all 
immaterial rights irrespective of their origin.  
2.2 Contract Law: Post–Sale Restrictions 
Contract law is a body of law separate from IP law. Freedom of contract is an 
important principle in market economies and is only encroached upon if there are 
interests more important to the jurisdiction in question. Examples of constraints 
on freedom of contract may be unenforceability due to inequalities in the 
concluding or the effect of the contract and unenforceability due to the subject 
                                                
20 TRIPS Article 6. 
21 WIPO, p. 4. 
22 Ghosh, p. v. 
23 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02. 
24 See, for example the Copyright Act (under Title 17, U.S.C.), the Patent Act (under Title 35, 
U.S.C.) and the Lanham Act (under Title 15, U.S.C.) regulating trademarks. 
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matter of the contract (such as contracts regarding illegal acts). Restrictions can also 
be found in other bodies of law, such as competition (antitrust) law and if they do 
not modify exhaustion, they may violate competition rules depending on their 
construction. Therefore, drafters of an agreement regarding IP law have to consider 
several aspects: contract law, IP law, private international law and competition law. 
Although IP law and competition law have been enacted in large (multi–state) 
jurisdictions, contract law remains local in contrast. As a consequence, complex 
conflicts of law can arise in IP contract disputes.25  
 
Ownership of the IPR and a physical object in which the IPR is incorporated are 
distinguished, transfer of the one does not mean transfer of the other. Post–sale 
restrictions of interest to this thesis can be narrowed down according to the 
following: the first objective of the IPR holder would be to avoid exhaustion 
altogether. Therefore, restrictions affecting the judgment of the elements of 
exhaustion are most attractive. The elements of exhaustion are specific for each 
jurisdiction and restrictions affecting them would, as a consequence, vary just the 
same between jurisdictions.  
 
As described above, the IPR offers a monopoly–like position for the proprietor and 
exhaustion of rights limits that position. The proprietor may therefore try to limit 
the effect of exhaustion by use of certain restricting practices. Focus is put on what 
effects exhaustion have on the IPR holder’s rights, i.e. what exclusive rights can no 
longer be enforced and are therefore of interest to attempt to retain? Some 
illustrative examples of restrictions are:26  
- territorial restrictions or limiting channels of distribution: whereby the proprietor 
retains other territories or channels of distribution for its own purposes, 
- tying clauses: obligating the buyer to buy other products or services together 
with the product incorporating the IPR, 
- field–of–use: limiting the buyer to use or resell within certain product 
markets, consumer groups or technological field, 
- anti–repair/enhancement/modification: prohibiting the buyer to alter the 
product, thereby forcing new purchases  
- price–fixing: obligating the buyer to resell the product at, over or under a 
certain price 
- non–challenge clause: obligating the buyer to not challenge the validity of the 
proprietor’s IPR, sanctioned by termination rights or penalty fees 
                                                
25 The curious reader can find further reading on private international law rules in James J. Fawcett 
& Paul L.C. Torremans, Intellectual property and private international law, (2011) Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
26 See contents of restrictions, described as used in IPR licensing by Gölstam. 
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3 The European Union Regulation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter includes a general introduction to EU exhaustion of IPRs and its 
development under influence of competition and free movement law. Next, the 
regulation of trademarks and patents in the EU is laid out, followed by an outline 
of the elements of the exhaustion doctrine as it has been expressed in case law. 
Finally, the effect and enforceability of post–sale restrictions in a contract context 
(after exhaustion has occurred) is presented.  
3.2 The European Union Competence Regarding 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Neither the TEU, nor the TFEU contains any provisions directly regarding IPRs. 
Nevertheless, the creation of an economy based on knowledge and innovation is 
seen as a priority in the EU.27 Furthermore, it is essential for the single market and 
in making the “fifth freedom”, the free movement of knowledge, that there is a 
clear regime for IPRs.28 Indirectly, the exercise of IPRs is considered to be a measure 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, prohibited by the TFEU Article 
34 as hindering the free movement of goods.29 Member states are, nevertheless, 
allowed to provide protection for IPRs according to TFEU Article 36. Stemming 
from TFEU Article 345, it expresses the general principle that the protection of 
intellectual and commercial property shall not be precluded by Article 34. Still, 
even though IPRs were not intended to be addressed on a Community level, they 
have been a topic of interest for the EU in many aspects of law. Already in 1964 the 
CJEU was challenged with settling tension between Community competition law 
and nationally granted IPRs. The joined cases Consten & Grundig,30 were decided by 
the CJEU, presenting the existence/exercise dichotomy, meaning that the grant and 
existence of the IPR were not affected by Community law but that in contrast, the 
exercise of such a right was found to be subject to Community regulation and could 
be challenged accordingly.31 IPRs do not necessarily have only negative effect on 
competition; they can have a positive effect when accompanied by rigorous 
application of competition rules to prevent abuses of rights.32 In respect of the rules 
of free movement, the CJEU developed a balance test where not all protection of 
                                                
27 COM(2011) 215 final, p. 1. 
28 COM(2008) 465 final, p. 3. 
29  Case 78-70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. 
KG, [1971] ECR 487 [Deutsche Grammophon]. 
30 Joined cases 56 and 58-64, Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission of the European Economic Community, [1966] ECR 429 [Consten & Grundig]. 
31 Consten & Grundig, p. 345, see also  Deutsche Grammophon, paragraph 6. 
32 COM(2008) 465 final, p. 3. 
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the exercise of IPRs is accepted under Article 36, but only protection to the extent 
that the specific subject matter of the IPR is protected.33 
 
Under the existence/exercise dichotomy, the grant and existence of an IPR remains 
exclusive to the member state and its laws.34 Consequently, the idea of an EU 
exhaustion doctrine has been criticized on the grounds that exhaustion is 
inherently dependent on the existence of a right to be the limit of and that since 
EU law does not grant IPRs (Community trademarks and designs excepted), there 
cannot be an EU exhaustion doctrine. What we consider to be that exhaustion 
doctrine is merely expressions of community law limiting the exercise of IPRs that 
have already been subject to national exhaustion doctrine but not found 
exhausted.35 Still, I will in the following use the term exhaustion, as the IPRs by 
definition are exhausted: i.e. the IPR holder is precluded from asserting his or her 
right due to EU regulation. Despite the intention of national property rights being 
excluded from EU rule, there is now a vast selection of community instruments 
regarding IPRs.  
3.3 Intellectual Property Rights: The Framework 
3.3.1 Trademarks 
The first area of IP law to be completely harmonized in the EU was trademark law, 
today as expressed by Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the 
member states relating to trademarks (“the Trademark Directive”) and Regulation 
207/2009 on the Community trademark (“the Trademark Regulation”). Both 
instruments secure identical exclusive rights for the trademark holder to exclude all 
third parties without the proprietor’s consent from using identical or similar marks 
that may lead to confusion.36 Moreover, both instruments have identical exhaustion 
rules–effectively harmonizing exhaustion: 
1. [The/A Community] trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its 
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community 
under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the 
proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of the goods, especially where the 
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the 
market.37  
Subsection 2 enables the proprietor to prohibit use of the mark even though the 
elements of exhaustion have been satisfied. These articles have been construed by 
the CJEU and a selection of cases is presented below, see section 3.4, to illustrate 
the elements of exhaustion. The CJEU has held that the specific subject matter of 
trademarks is that the proprietor has the exclusive right to use the trademark to put 
                                                
33  Deutsche Grammophon, paragraph 11.  
34 See TFEU Article 345 and Consten & Grundig. 
35 Westkamp, p. 318 f. 
36 Trademark Directive, Article 5, Trademark Regulation, Article 9. 
37 Trademark Directive, Article 7, Trademark Regulation, Article 13. 
 15 
goods bearing it on the market for the first time and to control their initial 
marketing in the EEA.38 
3.3.2 Patents 
Patent law, in contrast to trademark law, has not been harmonized under EU law. 
There is a patchwork of harmonizing EU–issued rules for specific areas, for 
example: supplementary protection for medicinal products and plant protection 
products as well as protection for biotechnological inventions.39 All EU member 
states have signed the EPC of 1973, effective from 1977, harmonizing the patent 
application procedure. As a result, the inventor may seek protection nationally state 
by state, or centralized through the European Patent Office (“EPO”), both 
procedures resulting in national protection provided by the states chosen by the 
applicant. Attempts at putting a community patent in place have been made 
sporadically, starting in 1989 with negotiations on the Community Patent 
Convention and further with a number of protocols, although without success.40  
 
Recently, progress has been made on creating a European patent with unitary 
effect, beginning with the Council’s decision 2011/167/EU, authorizing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection.41 The so–called 
“patent package” will be instituted by three instruments: (i) Regulation (EU) No 
1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (“the 
Unitary Patent Regulation”), (ii) Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012, with 
applicable translation arrangements and (iii) the Agreement on the Unified Patent 
Court.42 The purpose is for the system to be parallel to the existing national and 
European systems.43 The rights granted to the inventor in accordance with the 
Unitary Patent Regulation will be those given by the member state’s law under 
which the unitary patent is subject, see Article 5 and 7 for determination of which 
member state’s law is applicable. The Unitary Patent Regulation also defines 
exhaustion, using the same elements as the Trademark Directive and Regulation 
Article 6: 
                                                
38 Case C-16/03, Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB (formerly Handelskompaniet Factory Outlet 
i Löddeköpinge AB), [2004] ECR I-11313 [Peak Holding], paragraph 35 and therein cited case law.  
39 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a 
supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products and Directive 98/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions. 
40 Levin, p. 55. 
41 See further, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_en.htm, (as of March 
22, 2014). 
42 See European Parliament press release, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20121210IPR04506/html/Parliament-approves-EU-unitary-patent-rules (as of May 1, 
2014). 
43http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/businesses/intellectual_property/l2605
6_en.htm (as of May 1, 2014). 
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The rights conferred by a European patent with unitary effect shall not extend to 
acts concerning a product covered by that patent which are carried out within the 
participating Member States in which that patent has unitary effect after that 
product has been placed on the market in the Union by, or with the consent of, the patent 
proprietor, unless there are legitimate grounds for the patent proprietor to oppose 
further commercialisation of the product. [My emphasis] 
Article 6 implements the exhaustion rule as it is put forth in case law.44 The 
rationale behind the regulation is that it will contribute to the attainment of the 
objectives of the EU as articulated in TEU Article 3(3) (the establishment of an 
internal market) and that unitary patent protection will foster scientific and 
technological advances and the functioning of the internal market.45  
 
As the patent with unitary effect still has not come into effect, and the EPC only 
harmonizes procedural rules, the rules applicable to exhaustion of patent rights 
today are still the limits given by competition law in TFEU Articles 101 and 102 
and the rule of free movement in TFEU Article 34 with the exception given in 
Article 36.46 In contrast to other IPRs, patent exhaustion is by tradition general; i.e. 
all subsequent actions such as use, lending, renting, distribution and reparation 
(but not reproduction) cannot be excluded.47 The CJEU has held that the specific 
subject matter of patents is the exclusive right of first placing the product on the 
market.48 
 
Other community rules of relevance to post–sale restrictions and the exhaustion of 
patent rights are the block exemptions for technology transfer agreements and 
vertical agreements; see Regulation No 316/2014 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
technology transfer agreements (the “TTBER”) and Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices  (the “VRR”). These instruments clarify how certain practices 
should be exempted from competition law limitations. As such, they are also 
relevant for the analysis of restricting contract provisions and their status in EU 
law.  
                                                
44 Unitary Patent Regulation, premise 12 in the preamble. 
45 Unitary Patent Regulation, premise 1 and 4 in the preamble. 
46 The ”patent package” enters into force from the date of entry into force of the Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court (Unitary Patent Regulation, Article 18.2 and Council Regulation (EU) No 
1260/2012, Article 7.2). The Agreement will entry into force when ratified by thirteen member 
states and is of May 11, 2014 ratified by two member states. 
47 Levin, p. 311 f. Also note the wording of Article 6 of the Unitary Patent Regulation: “The rights 
conferred by a […] patent […]”, compared to the wording of the Trademark Directive and 
Regulation: “[The/A Community] trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use 
[…]”[my emphasis]. 
48 See Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc, [1974] ECR 1147 
[Centrafarm], paragraph 9; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. Inc. v Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus 
Exler, [1981] ECR 2063 [Merck v Stephar], paragraph 9 and Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v Hoechst 
AG, [1985] ECR 2281 [Pharmon], paragraph 26. 
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3.4 Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights 
3.4.1 Background 
Previous to the harmonizing of trademark law, and currently in regards to patents 
(outside of harmonized areas), the exercise of IPRs was limited (exhausted) by other 
Community rules and principles. The doctrine of exhaustion has grown from a 
body of case law emanating from free movement and competition law cases brought 
before the CJEU. Some of those cases are presented below in the outline of the 
exhaustion doctrine’s elements. The doctrine shall promote the essential purpose of 
the treaty, “which is to unite national markets into a single market”.49 Accordingly, 
the doctrine has its base in the rule regarding free movement, see TFEU Article 34 
(as limited by Article 36), and the rules regarding competition, see TFEU 101 and 
102.50 Free movement as a premise for the establishment of an internal market is a 
fundamental principle in the EU.51 Derogations from free movement by exercise of 
IPRs are allowed, under the condition that they are justified for the purpose of 
safeguarding rights that constitute the specific subject matter of the IPR.52 Following 
harmonization through the Trademark Directive, the elements of exhaustion have 
been further analyzed by the CJEU in that context. There is no reason to believe 
that the exhaustion doctrine would be construed differently for different IPRs.53 
The following presentation will be sectioned according to the elements of the rule: 
exhaustion occurs in relation to (i) goods, (ii) put on the market, (iii) by the 
proprietor or with his consent.  
3.4.2 First Element of Exhaustion: Goods  
As a limitation of the exclusive rights, the exhaustion doctrine’s scope in relation to 
individual objects incorporating IPRs has been questioned. For example, does 
“goods” refer to a line or type of products, or does it refer to individual items? The 
seminal case regarding the definition of goods is Sebago.54 The case was brought 
regarding shoes manufactured with Sebago’s trademark in El Salvador that were 
imported to and sold in Belgium, where Sebago was the proprietor of two 
trademarks. There were no disagreements regarding the shoes being genuine 
goods.55 Sebago and its exclusive distributor in Belgium (collectively Sebago) sued 
the selling company G–B Unic for infringement, arguing that they had not 
consented to the sale of those shoes in the Community. While Sebago claimed that 
consent had to be found for each batch of goods, G–B Unic argued that the lawful 
marketing of similar goods bearing the same trademark in the Community was 
sufficient to satisfy the element. G–B Unic’s argument was supported with the 
                                                
49 Deutsche Grammophon, paragraph 12. 
50 Ghosh, p. 36. 
51 Compare TEU Article 3.3 and TFEU Title II. 
52 Deutsche Grammophon, premise 11. 
53 Rognstad, p. 476. 
54 Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison Dubois & Fils SA v G-B Unic SA, [1999] ECR 
I-4103 [Sebago].. 
55 Goods are ”genuine” if their origin is true, that is, the business associated with the mark, see 
Levin, p. 447. 
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reasoning that the essential function of trademarks is to guarantee to the consumer 
the identity of the product’s origin. Therefore, it could not be implied that the 
proprietor had a right to prohibit the import of genuine goods.  
 
The CJEU found that the wording of Article 7(1) in the Trademark Directive alone 
did not provide a definition of “good”.56 The CJEU continued by finding that 
exhaustion only occurs in respect of individual items put on the market with the 
proprietor’s consent in the territory there defined and referred to previous case 
law.57 According to the CJEU, this interpretation was confirmed by Article 7(2) in 
its reference to “further commercialisation” of goods, showing that only specific 
goods are considered under the principle of exhaustion.58 It may be noted that 
Article 7(2) differs from Article 5 and 7(1) in the sense that the first refers to goods 
in definite form (i.e. the goods with changed or impaired condition) and the two 
latter in the indefinite.59 Conclusively, exhaustion is only effective in respect of 
individual, identifiable, goods put on the market within the EEA by the proprietor 
or with his consent. 
3.4.3 Second Element of Exhaustion: Put on the Market 
The Act 
To trigger exhaustion of the IPRs in the individual good, the object has to be put on 
the market. The element consists of two parts: (i) the putting (the act) of an object 
incorporating the IPR (ii) on the market (the territory). Where the act is carried out 
within the territory, the element is satisfied. The definition on what act would 
effectively satisfy the active part of this element was left unsettled for some time. 
There have been some creative suggestions on alternative triggering acts in regards 
to exhaustion of trademark protection: production, stock–keeping, offer for sale 
and actual sale.60 Production as a triggering event was discarded without much ado, 
as the proprietor at any time may choose to cancel production, to not market or sell 
the objects or to transfer the products to a jurisdiction outside the EU.61 Stock–
keeping as a triggering event per se would mean that protection for most products 
produced in the EEA area would be exhausted, and the adding of a subjective 
element was suggested. For example: “stock–keeping with intent to offer products 
on the Community market” would make a more reasonable triggering event.62 Case 
law does not treat production as a triggering act and stock–keeping could be 
implied as discarded by some cases. For example, stock–keeping was probably at 
hand within the Community in Silhouette63 even though it was not considered in 
the judgment.  
 
                                                
56 Sebago, p 19. 
57 Sebago, paragraphs 19-20. 
58 Sebago, paragraph 20. 
59 See Lidgard I, p. 117. 
60 Id., p. 123. 
61 Id.  
62 Lidgard I, p. 125. 
63 See below in The Territory.  
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Offer for sale as a triggering act was argued in Peak Holding. Peak Performance 
Production produced and sold clothes and accessories marked with the trademark 
Peak Performance in Sweden and other countries. The company was granted use of 
the trademark by its proprietor, Peak Holding (another company in the same 
group). The garments in question in the case before the CJEU had been offered for 
sale in shops in the EEA following their import from a non–EEA manufacturing 
site. The parties disagreed on the conditions under which the garments had been 
offered for sale: Peak Holding claimed that they had been offered in Peak 
Performance Production’s shops while the other party argued that they had been 
offered for sale by independent resellers. Later, they were offered for sale to final 
consumers in Copenhagen by a sister company to Peak Performance Production 
before the total consignment of (unsold) garments was sold to a French company. 
Peak Holding claimed that the sales contract included a clause whereby the French 
company was prohibited to sell the garments in other countries than Russia and 
Slovenia, with an exception of 5 % of the total quantity which could be sold in 
France. The garments came to be offered for sale by Factory Outlet in Sweden. Peak 
Holding sued Factory Outlet for infringement and Factory Outlet argued that the 
case should be dismissed as the trademark rights in the garments had been 
exhausted.  
 
The CJEU found that the expression “put on the market” is a decisive element of 
exhaustion of rights and that as a result, it must be given a uniform interpretation 
in the Community legal order (as opposed to being open for national 
interpretation). 64  Next, the CJEU concluded that the wording alone was not 
decisive as to its meaning and that the interpretation therefore had to be made with 
regard to the scheme and objectives of the Trademark Directive.65 In particular, the 
Trademark Directive is intended to ensure that the proprietor has the exclusive 
right to use the trademark to put goods bearing it on the market for the first time 
and to control their initial marketing in the EEA.66 Furthermore, it is intended to 
enable others to further market an individual item without the proprietor being 
able to oppose that marketing.67 The CJEU stated that a trademark’s essential role 
in the system of undistorted competition, which the TEU seeks to establish, is 
fulfilled by it guaranteeing the quality of what is bearing the mark by the proprietor 
being in control of manufacture and supply.68 It was not disputed that where the 
proprietor sells goods bearing his trademark to a third party within the EEA, those 
goods are put on the market in the meaning of Article 7.1.69 In contrast, Peak 
Holding’s import with a view to sell or the offer to sell goods within the EEA did 
not trigger exhaustion.70 This followed because an offer to sell did not transfer the 
right to dispose of the goods to third parties and did not allow the proprietor to 
realize the economic value of the trademark. The interest to stay in control of the 
                                                
64 Peak Holding, paragraph 31-32. 
65 Id., paragraph 33. 
66 Id., paragraphs  35-36 and therein referenced case law. 
67 Id., paragraphs 37-38 and therein referenced case law. 
68 Id., paragraph 38. 
69 Id., paragraph 39. 
70 Id., paragraph 41. 
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goods to ensure their quality remained.71 For these reasons, the CJEU drew the 
conclusion that a sale, allowing the proprietor to realize the economic value of his 
trademark, exhausts the exclusive rights conferred by the Trademark Directive.72 
Finally, the CJEU stated that this interpretation was supported by the wording of 
Article 5(3)(b) and (c) in the Trademark Directive, declaring the content of the 
rights conferred on the proprietor, which also distinguishes between different acts.73  
 
A question rising from the CJEU’s judgment in Peak Holding is to whom the sale 
needs to be made to trigger exhaustion. A rule that would trigger exhaustion by a 
sale to the end user only, or by any sale, would make the judicial review less 
complicated and it would also make the system predictable. Nevertheless, a rule 
where only a sale to the end user triggers exhaustion would impair the free 
movement of goods.74 Another alternative is to set the dividing line somewhere in 
between the two extremes of the scale (exhaustion upon any sale vs. exhaustion 
upon sale to end user) and trigger exhaustion upon a sale to an intermediary. Such 
a sale can take place within different intermediary relationships and there is reason 
to separate them based on the economic links between the proprietor and the 
buyer, but also based on transfer of title.75 
The Territory 
As earlier described, the act has to be made within the relevant territory to satisfy 
the element of being “put on the market”. In regards to the definition of the 
territory, member states practiced different definitions previous to the 
harmonization in the Trademark Directive.76 As a consequence, the territory in 
which the act could be carried out and result in satisfaction of the element varied. 
As presented in chapter 2, the control over objects’ distribution is one of the 
exclusive rights granted to the IPR holder. It is in this context that the IPR holder 
makes efforts to prevent parallel import and the parallel importer makes efforts to 
prove that the IPR has been exhausted. Much of the CJEU’s case law regarding 
exhaustion is related to parallel import issues, as can be seen in the following. The 
relevant territory has been defined by the CJEU in Silhouette that confirmed 
previous case law establishing EU–wide exhaustion. 77  Silhouette, an Austrian 
company, produced, distributed and sold spectacles. The spectacles were in the 
higher price range and Silhouette refused to supply low–price distributors with the 
spectacles as it believed that it would be harmful to its image as a provider of high–
                                                
71 Id., paragraph 42. 
72 Peak Holding, paragraph  40, compare exhaustion by “first sale” of copyright distribution right in 
Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property (codified version), Article 9.2. 
73 Peak Holding, paragraph 43. 
74 Lidgard I, p. 129. 
75 See Lidgard I, p. 128 ff. 
76 Lidgard II, p. 76 f. 
77 Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, [1998] ECR I-4799 [Silhouette], see previously Dansk Supermarked (full 
citation below) and later confirmed by Sebago, paragraphs 17 and 22) and Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss 
(full citation below), paragraph 32. 
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quality spectacles. In the case before the court, Silhouette had a large quantity of 
out–of–fashion spectacle frames that it had sold to a Bulgarian company with 
specific instructions to its representative that the purchasing company be made 
aware that the spectacle frames were not be exported to other countries than those 
in the former USSR. However not confirmed by the court, this was communicated 
by the representative to the purchaser. Shortly following the delivery of the frames 
to Bulgaria, the frames were reimported and offered for sale in Austria. Silhouette 
sued the offering company, Hartlauer, for infringement.  
 
When answering the questions posed by the Austrian court, the CJEU declared 
that exhaustion only occurs when “the products have been put on the market in the 
Community (in the EEA since the EEA Agreement entered into force)” and that 
this followed directly from the wording of the directive.78 Furthermore, the CJEU 
viewed an interpretation of the directive with the effect that Article 7 does not 
comprehensively resolve the question of exhaustion of rights as contrary to the 
wording of the article and also against the scheme and purpose of the rules of the 
Trademark Directive. 79  Accordingly, the CJEU was of the view that the only 
interpretation fully capable of ensuring that the purpose of the Trademark 
Directive was achieved (safeguarding the functioning of the internal market) was 
that Articles 5 to 7 completely harmonized the rules relating to the rights conferred 
by a trademark.80 Consequently, the relevant territory as exhaustion is concerned is 
the EEA and there is no room for the member states to provide otherwise. The 
effect of Silhouette is that within the EEA, the IPR holder could no longer control 
the further distribution or use of the object incorporating the IPR after it has been 
put on the market by the proprietor or with his consent. Whether or not IPR 
protection is given in the state where the object is put on the market is irrelevant; 
the right is still exhausted.81 
3.4.4 Third Element of Exhaustion: By the Proprietor or With 
His Consent 
Put on the Market by the Proprietor or Someone Sufficiently Linked to Him 
The final element that needs to be satisfied for exhaustion to be triggered is that the 
individual item has been put on the market by the proprietor or with his consent. In 
some cases, the products are sold by an undertaking linked to the proprietor in a 
manner that the CJEU has evaluated the sale as if it had been made by the 
proprietor. It should be noted that the nature of consent given by the proprietor to 
the undertaking in such a relationship is not the consent that triggers exhaustion 
                                                
78 Silhouette, paragraph 18. 
79 Id., paragraphs 21-22. 
80 Id., paragraphs 25-27. 
81 See CJEU cases Merck v Stephar and joined cases C-267/95 and C-268/95, Merck & Co. Inc., 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Ltd and Merck Sharp & Dohme International Services BV v Primecrown 
Ltd, Ketan Himatlal Mehta, Bharat Himatlal Mehta and Necessity Supplies Ltd and Beecham Group 
plc v Europharm of Worthing Ltd, [1996] ECR I-6285 [Merck v Primecrown].
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since it is not given for individual products. 82  Examples of relationships that 
substitute for a sale made by the proprietor are economic links such as licensing, 
group affiliation such as parent/subsidiary and exclusive distribution agreements 
but not assignment.83 In the absence of such a relationship, the proprietor is able to 
invoke its rights against import of products incorporating the IPR even if they have 
been produced following an assignment of rights to another party (without such 
links to it) in other member states (unless the proprietor has consented to such 
import). In contrast, an assignment for a geographical area of only part of the whole 
territory which the right covers (for example a regional assignment of a nationally 
granted IPR) is rendered void as being against the principle of free movement and 
does not create separate sources of trademarked products.84 These examples are 
retrieved from trademark case law, but similar notions are at hand in other case 
law.85 Compulsory licenses do not satisfy this element as only voluntary dispositions 
are regarded.86 Recall also that the CJEU stated in Sebago that consent has to be 
expressed for individual objects. That means that there is no consent where a 
licensee produces more than the approved number of objects or when the licensee 
puts the object on the market in a territory to which the consent did not extend.87 
Put on the Market by a Third Party with the Proprietor’s Consent 
If there is no link between the proprietor and the seller as described above but it is 
a third party marketing the product on the EEA market, the CJEU investigates 
whether the proprietor has renounced its rights by consenting to the act. Consent 
may be express or implied. In joined cases Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, the CJEU 
answered questions regarding the nature of consent required to trigger exhaustion. 
In Zino Davidoff, the proprietor (Davidoff) owned two trademarks registered in the 
U.K.. The products were sold both within and outside of the EEA. Davidoff had an 
exclusive distributor in Singapore, with which it had contracted that the distributor 
would only sell the products in certain territories outside the EEA and that it would 
include in its sales contracts a prohibiting clause binding the purchasers to not sell 
the products outside the assigned territory. Products originating from Singapore 
were later imported to the U.K.. Davidoff sued the company that imported and 
sold the products for infringement, arguing that the exclusive rights in the products 
had not been exhausted because Davidoff had not consented to them being put on 
the EEA market. In Levi Strauss, jeans (genuine goods) were imported from 
countries outside the EEA. Both the proprietor and the license holder of the U.K. 
trademarks (collectively Levis) had been very particular about the distribution of 
their product, only selling the jeans by granting licenses to other retailers or 
through a selective distribution system. They had consistently refused to sell the 
products to the companies that later came to sell them in the U.K. following their 
                                                
82 See Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danzinger v Ideal-Standard 
GmbH and Wabco Standard GmbH, [1994] ECR I-2789 [IHT], paragraph 43. 
83 See IHT, paragraphs 34, 45-46. 
84 See IHT, paragraph 53. 
85 See Centrafarm, paragraph 20. 
86 See Pharmon. 
87 Levin, p. 312.  
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import to the EEA. The products were originally obtained from countries in North 
America, where Levis had informed their authorized retailers, both orally and in 
writing, that the jeans were only to be sold to end purchasers in certain quantities. 
Levis was not in a contractual relationship with the companies that it sued.  
 
The CJEU reasoned that the Trademark Directive limited exhaustion to cases 
where goods had been put on the market in the EEA and allowed the proprietor to 
market products outside the area without exhausting its rights within the EEA, in 
line with its holding in Silhouette.88 Next, the CJEU discussed whether consent 
should be given a uniform interpretation or if it should be interpreted as a matter 
of national law. The CJEU found that the concept of consent should be given a 
uniform interpretation.89 If it would be a matter of national law, the concept could 
carry different meanings depending on the legal system concerned. This could 
result in a variation of protection for trademark holders and was therefore contrary 
to the Trademark Directive’s objective as put forth in the preamble.90  
 
This particular holding is interesting in the light of the argument made by the 
English judge who had referred the Zino Davidoff case to the CJEU. He argued that 
there was no presumption against consent in Community law, but that the issue of 
consent had to be evaluated with regard to all relevant circumstances including the 
nature of the goods, the circumstances under which they were put on the market, 
the terms of any contracts for sale and the provisions of any applicable law.91 The 
contract under which Zino Davidoff had put the products on the market outside 
the EEA was found by the English court to be concluded under English law (or a 
law assumed as being the same) and consequently, the importing company was free 
to market the goods in the EEA since English law assumes that “[w]hen a man has 
purchased an article he expects to have the control of it, and there must be some 
clear and explicit agreement to the contrary to justify the vendor in saying that he 
has not given the purchaser his licence to sell the article, or to use it wherever he 
pleases as against himself.”92 
 
The CJEU established in Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss that consent is to be uniformly 
interpreted and it also discussed the nature of consent as express or implied. It 
concluded that the intention to renounce exclusive rights must be unequivocally 
demonstrated, which normally will be expressly stated.93 Consent may, nevertheless, 
be implied by facts and circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to 
the placing of the goods on the market.94 The same criteria for determining consent 
                                                
88  Joined cases C-414/99 to C-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v A & G Imports Ltd and Levi Strauss & 
Co. and Others v Tesco Stores Ltd and Others, [2001] ECR I-8691 [Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss], 
paragraph 33. 
89 Id., paragraph 43. 
90 Id., paragraph 42. 
91 High Court, Laddie, J., Zino Davidoff SA v. A&G Imports Ltd., May 18, 1999, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 
1056 [Laddie, J.], paragraphs 36 and 38.7. 
92 Laddie, J., paragraphs 28-29. 
93 Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, paragraphs 48-60. 
94 Id., paragraphs 46-47. 
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are always applicable when a third party puts goods on the EEA market, irrespective 
of the goods originating within or outside of the EEA.95 Implied consent may not 
be inferred from the mere silence of the proprietor and it may not be inferred from: 
the fact that the proprietor fails to communicate their opposition against 
subsequent marketing within the EEA; that the goods are not marked with a 
warning that prohibits their placing on the market within the EEA; that title has 
been transferred without restriction and that in such absence of restrictions, the 
governing law of the contract includes at least a right to market the goods 
subsequently within the EEA.96 
 
In Coty Prestige,97 the proprietor Coty Prestige manufactured perfumery goods under 
its own and also third party trademarks, which it marketed throughout the world by 
the means of a selective distribution system. The standardized agreement concluded 
between Coty Prestige and its distributors contained a term where Coty Prestige 
remained in title to all advertising material and the distributors were prohibited to 
commercially use the material, in particular samples, testers or miniatures. The 
materials could, according to the contract, be withdrawn at any time by the 
proprietor. The testers at issue in the case were original bottles with original 
perfume without their original seal, instead labeled “Demonstration”. The box 
containing the bottle had also been made in black and white rather than color and 
had been provided with the text “Demonstration” and “Not for sale”. Following 
Coty Prestige obtaining two testers in Germany, it sued Simex Trading, who had 
imported the testers from Singapore, for infringement. Simex Trading claimed that 
the trademark rights had been exhausted, while Coty Prestige maintained that title 
to the testers never had passed and that it was advertising material. The national 
court dismissed the application, holding that exhaustion had occurred on grounds 
that a de facto right of disposal (the use of all the bottle’s content) was transferred 
and that the contractual restrictions did not have any effects on exhaustion.  
 
The CJEU pointed to the proprietor’s control over the first putting on the market 
in the EEA as being essential.98 It also confirmed Sebago by reciting the rule that 
rights are only exhausted in respect of individual products.99 It distinguished Peak 
Holding, as the issue was not regarding goods carried out in the EEA by the 
proprietor or someone with economic links to him, but instead the products were 
put on the market by a third person.100 In such circumstances, exhaustion can only 
occur as a result of the proprietor’s express or implied consent. The CJEU stated 
that implied consent, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is precluded when 
the goods are marked with the wording “Demonstration” and “Not for sale”, there 
is a prohibition on sale, no transfer of ownership, the goods may be recalled at any 
                                                
95 Case C-324/08, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV, Metro Cash & Carry BV and Remo 
Zaandam BV v Diesel SpA, [2009] ECR I-10019 [Makro], paragraph 35. 
96 Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, paragraphs 55-57, 60. 
97 Case C-127/09, Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v Simex Trading AG, [2010] ECR I—4965 
[Coty Prestige]. 
98 Coty Prestige, paragraph 30. 
99 Id., paragraph 31. 
100 Id., paragraphs 33-34. 
 25 
time and they are clearly presented so that they are distinguishable from regular 
goods provided by the proprietor.101 Consequently, there was no consent for Simex 
Trading to put the testers on the market within the EEA. 
3.5 Effect and Enforceability of Restricting 
Contract Provisions 
3.5.1 Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Law 
IPRs can be transferred, just like other property, between parties.102 As a general 
rule, regular contract principles apply to these transfers as if they were any other 
type of property. 103  Explicit comments on post–sale restrictions in relation to 
exhaustion are few. Outside IP case law, post–sale restrictions are judged in a 
contract law setting and case law is scarce, as most contractual disputes are resolved 
through arbitration or other non–official dispute resolution. The contract is often 
construed strictly by its wording, which emphasizes the importance of vigilance 
when contracting about IPRs.104 
3.5.2 Post–Sale Restrictions’ Effects on Exhaustion 
As noted in chapter two, the main objective for the IPR holder is to not have the 
IPRs exhausted. Contract restrictions expressing the IPR holder’s intent regarding 
the sold item could be a source of proof to be taken into account when judging if 
there is consent or not. However, the CJEU has shown suspicion against contract 
terms attempting to apply post–sale restrictions. For example, in Peak Holding, the 
CJEU stated that a sale made directly by the proprietor is not also subject to the 
element of consent to trigger exhaustion.105 Consequently, “[a]ny stipulation, in the 
act of sale effecting the first putting on the market in the EEA, of territorial restrictions 
on the right to resell the goods concerns only the relations between the parties to 
that act” and cannot preclude exhaustion.106 In Dansk Supermarked, 107 a Danish 
company agreed with an English manufacturer that the English company would 
manufacture a china service and that sub–standard pieces (approximately 20 
percent of the production), which were not delivered to the Danish company, could 
be sold in the U.K. but not exported to Denmark or other Scandinavian countries. 
The case came before the court after another Danish company bought a series of 
china services in the U.K. and marketed them in Denmark. The CJEU found, 
based on the rules of free movement, that the IPRs regarding the sub–standard 
china had been exhausted when they were lawfully marketed in a member state by 
the proprietor or with his consent. Furthermore, the contract term prohibiting 
export to Scandinavian countries could not be relied on to classify the marketing of 
                                                
101 Id., paragraph 48. 
102 Levin, p. 502. 
103 Bernitz, p. 408. 
104 Levin, p. 502. 
105 Peak Holding, paragraphs 52-53. 
106 Peak Holding, paragraphs 54-55, [my emphasis]. 
107 Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v A/S Imerco, [1981] ECR 181 [Dansk Supermarked]. 
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imported goods as an improper or unfair commercial practice, as it would derogate 
from the rules of free movement. In Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, the CJEU stated 
that since consent may not be inferred by silence, “the preservation of [] exclusive 
right[s] cannot depend on there being an express prohibition of marketing within 
the EEA.”108 Therefore, national rules on sales restrictions against third parties are 
not relevant in a dispute concerning the preservation or extinction of IPRs between 
the proprietor and a subsequent trader in the distribution chain.109 
 
In contrast to the suspicion against post–sale restrictions shown above, Coty Prestige 
taught us that a restricting contract term may preclude implied consent.110 In Copad, 
the CJEU recognized that a trademark holder may invoke its rights against a 
licensee acting in breach of a license term on condition that the term is recognized 
in Article 8(2) in the Trademark Directive.111 This despite that “[w]here a licensee 
puts goods bearing the mark on the market he must, as a rule, be considered to be 
doing so with the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, for the purposes of 
Article 7(1) of the Directive,”112 meaning that the proprietor may not rely on the 
contract in order to invoke trademark rights against the licensee.113 Although Copad 
and Dansk Supermarked may seem similar, they are different in some respects; as the 
respondent in Dansk Supermarked was not a licensee, and the proprietor had 
consented to the putting on the market of the sub–standard china, where Copad 
assumes consent by license.  
3.5.3 Post–Sale Restrictions’ Enforceability in Contract Law 
The secondary goal for the IPR holder, assuming that exhaustion is not affected by 
post–sale restrictions, would be to retain some control over the products even after 
exhaustion has occurred. Some cases explicitly state that the contract provision is a 
question of contract law alone and that it has no effect on the IPR or third parties; 
recall the holding in Peak Holding recounted above. Now, if the restriction is “only 
valid between the parties”, it is subject to the laws of the EU just like any other 
contract term.  
 
Under EU competition law, agreements that prevent, restrict or distort the 
competition in a manner that affects trade between the member states are 
prohibited according to TFEU Article 101(1). Agreements that do not affect trade 
between the member states are not prohibited and there are also other agreements 
that escape the application of Article 101(1) by means of the exemptions in 
Article 101(3). A prohibited agreement that is not exempted under Article 101(3) is 
automatically void, see Article 101(2). Agreements that improve production or 
distribution of goods or that promote technical or economic progress, while 
                                                
108 Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, paragraph 64. 
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111 Case C-59/08, Copad SA v Christian Dior couture SA, Vincent Gladel and Société industrielle 
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allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, are exempt. The existence 
and exercise of IPRs are not of themselves incompatible with EU competition law, 
but will only violate competition rules in exceptional circumstances, in particular 
when the proprietor has market power and the exercise is likely to eliminate 
competition in the relevant market.114  
 
The exemption in TFEU Article 101(3) is clarified in certain aspects by the block 
exemptions TTBER and VRR. It is important to note that TTBER is only 
applicable to technology transfer agreements, i.e. a licensing agreement (and not 
sales agreements) for the purpose of production or an assignment of rights for the 
purpose of production, see Article 1 of the TTBER. The “safe harbor” provided by 
the TTBER is only available for competing parties with a combined share of less 
than 20 percent of the relevant market and non–competing parties with a 
combined share of less than 30 percent of the relevant market, see Article 3 in the 
TTBER. Some restrictions are prohibited, no matter if the agreement otherwise 
would be exempted from TFEU Article 101(1), and the prohibitions are differently 
worded depending on if the companies are competitors or not. Some examples of 
prohibited restrictions are: price–fixing, output restrictions, allocation of markets 
or customers, restriction of licensee’s ability to exploit its own technology rights, 
grant–back clauses and non–challenge provisions.115  
 
The VRR exempts agreements between parties on different levels of the production 
or distribution chain. An agreement containing provisions regarding the 
assignment or use of IPRs by the buyer is exempted only if the provision is ancillary 
(not the primary object), directly related to the use, sale or resale of products by the 
buyer or its customers, and not restricting competition in a manner that is not 
exempted by the regulation, see Article 2(3) in the VRR.116 In the case that the 
agreement includes an IPR license, it has been argued that the applicability of the 
VRR depends on the proximity of a contract to a vertical supply agreement rather 
than to a license, where the TTBER instead may be applicable.117 Certain provisions 
in a vertical agreement will, however, take it outside the safe harbor provided by the 
VRR, for example: price–fixing terms, territorial restrictions, active or passive sales 
restrictions in selective distribution systems, cross–supply restrictions within a 
selective distribution system, non–compete obligations and indirect obligations to 
not sell competing brands.118 
 
In Consten & Grundig, the CJEU struck down an agreement between the proprietor 
and an exclusive distributor containing restrictions that neither the proprietor nor 
other concessionaires or wholesalers would sell, actively or passively, products 
                                                
114 COM(2008) 465 final, p. 9. 
115 TTBER, Articles 4-5. Further guidance on the TTBER may be found in Communication from 
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the European Union to technology transfer agreements, 2014/C 89/03. 
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within the area of the exclusive distributor and that the exclusive distributor would 
register the trademark affixed to the proprietor’s products so as to be able to 
prevent others from importing products into the area of exclusive distribution.119 
The agreement was found to distort competition in the single market by separation 
of national markets there within.120 
 
IPR protection is not market power in itself.121 Still, an IPR holder with a dominant 
position is subject to TFEU Article 102 when exercising the IPR. For example, 
refusal to license may violate competition law, as could a restriction on further 
distribution.122 In Sot. Lélos kai Sia, the refusal by a proprietor with a dominant 
position to supply an existing customer without an objective reason was found to be 
abusive where it was liable to eliminate a trading party as a competitor.123 An actor 
is presumed as having a dominant position if its share of the relevant market is 50 
percent or more, while 40 percent or more usually is enough to find that the actor 
has a dominant position.124 Although Article 102 does not have a provision similar 
to Article 101(2), rendering the agreement void if it violates the prohibition, it is 
likely that Article 102 has the same effect.125  
 
If the contract term is not classified as anti–competitive, it may still violate the 
principle of free movement.126 Agreements that have a market dividing effect have 
been held as against the rule of free movement.127 It should be noted that the 
principle of free movement prohibits between member states quantitative restrictions 
on imports and all measures having equivalent effect, see TFEU Article 34. 
Nevertheless, if the enforcement of the term is considered a measure having 
equivalent effect, the contract term will only be left effective if it is within the 
specific subject matter of the IPR. Recall that the specific subject matter for 
trademarks is that the proprietor has the exclusive right to use the trademark to put 
goods bearing it on the market for the first time and to control their initial 
marketing in the EEA; and that the specific subject matter of patents is the 
exclusive right of first placing the product on the market. In Dansk Supermarked, the 
proprietor had restricted the English manufacturer to only sell the sub–standard 
china in the U.K. and not to the Scandinavian countries. That restriction could not 
be relied on as preserving IPRs that could be invoked against a third party importer 
because the IPRs had been exhausted when the sub–standard china was lawfully 
marketed in the U.K. by the proprietor or with his consent.128  
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4 The United States Regulation 
4.1 Introduction 
The following comparative perspective provided by U.S. law will be concentrated to 
patent law, where interesting developments have taken place regarding the patent 
owner’s right to control IPR protected objects following their sale. In 2008, the 
Supreme Court (hereinafter also “the Court”) decided the first patent exhaustion 
case since 1942, Quanta.129 The hope was that the Court in this case would resolve 
the uncertainties of the compatibility of the first sale doctrine and the conditional 
sale doctrine put forth by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt.130 However, Quanta 
did not mention Mallinckrodt at all, leaving uncertainties unsolved and creating new 
questions regarding the conditional sale doctrine’s standing as good law. 
 
This chapter includes a general introduction to U.S. patent law and exhaustion 
hereunder, followed by descriptions of the doctrines of “first sale” (or exhaustion) 
and conditional sale. Finally, the enforceability of post–sale restrictions in contract 
law is explored.  
4.2 Patent Law and Exhaustion of Patent Rights 
Protection for IPRs is long recognized in the U.S., as the U.S. Constitution 
authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights in the form of copyrights and patents, 
see Article I, Section 8 
The Congress shall have power […] To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 
Consequently, IPR protection is given by federal law and laws instituted on the 
state level may be preempted to a certain extent.131 Accordingly, the rights conferred 
by copyrights, patents and trademarks may be found in the Copyright Act, the 
Patent Act and the Lanham Act, respectively. The Copyright Act is the only statute 
containing a black letter rule of exhaustion. 132  There are no similar statutory 
exhaustion rules for patents or trademarks but the principle has instead developed 
in common law.  
 
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters. 133 Cases may be 
brought in district court and any appeal is under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
                                                
129 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008). 
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Circuit, whereby judgments may be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 134 
Applicable laws for the protection of patents are found in Title 35 of the United 
States Code (the “U.S.C.”). The inventor is granted rights to exclude others from 
exploiting the patented invention.  
[…] the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, […] products made by that 
process […]135 
Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the 
patent.136 
If the patent holder would exercise such a right to exclude, the accused infringer 
may use one of several defenses, for example: the doctrines of implied license and 
first sale.137 In patent law, an authorized sale includes an implied license to use the 
patented article. 138  The idea is that the inventor, when selling the invention, 
implicitly grants the buyer a license to use it.139 The first sale doctrine authorizes the 
buyer to use and sell the article. Also known as exhaustion, the first sale doctrine is 
the expression of the theory that the inventor surrenders the right to control the 
use and sale of the invention upon selling it to the buyer.140 Exhaustion is effective, 
securing certain rights to the buyer, and the patent holder may not restrict use in a 
manner that would interfere with for example the right to repair.141 The doctrine 
has been laid out in case law and was restated by Quanta as: “the initial authorized 
sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”142 
 
There are two competing rationales for the exhaustion of patent rights by applying 
the first sale doctrine, the first being that “the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled 
with respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward […] 
by the sale of the article.”143 The prominent rationale is that the purpose of patent 
law is fulfilled upon the first sale of the product as the patent owner has the 
opportunity to collect its rewards for its invention. The second, alternative rationale 
is that the first sale doctrine rests on implied agreement and may be altered by 
express agreement or other circumstances.144  
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4.3 Alternative Rationales for Exhaustion 
4.3.1 An Infringement Defense: The “First Sale” Doctrine 
The 1800s 
Preceding Quanta is a line of cases where the Supreme Court has developed the 
first sale doctrine. Bloomer v. McQuewan, decided in 1852, is often referred to as the 
first case where the Supreme Court applied the first sale doctrine.145 The patent 
holder had sold the right to construct and use machines covered by the patent at 
issue. During the term of the patent, Congress extended the length of the term. 
The purchaser continued to use the machines after the original term had expired 
and the patent holder sued the purchaser for infringement. The Court rejected the 
claim of the patent holder, holding that the purchaser gained ownership of the 
machines made during the original term and that, accordingly, “when the machine 
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the 
monopoly”.146 
 
Two decades following McQuewan, in Adams v. Burke, a patent holder assigned its 
patent on coffin lids to a company with the restriction that the company only had 
the right to make, sell, and use the products within a ten–mile radius of the city of 
Boston. Adams, who had been assigned the remaining patent rights sued Burke for 
infringement by use of the coffin lids at a location seventeen miles from Boston. 
Burke had purchased the coffin lids, free of conditions or restrictions, in Boston by 
the company based there. The Supreme Court rejected the infringement claim, 
stating that ”a purchaser […] of a single coffin acquired the right to use that coffin 
for the purpose for which all coffins are used.”147 Furthermore, “[i]t would be to 
engraft a limitation upon the right of use not contemplated by the statute nor 
within the reason of the contract to say that it could only be used within the ten–
miles circle.”148 This was motivated with the rationale that when “the patentee or 
his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which 
he claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is 
open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction on account of the 
monopoly of the patentees.”149 
Early 1900s 
In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court upheld post–sale restrictions on a patented 
article’s use in A.B. Dick. The patent holder had sold a patented rotary mimeograph 
machine on which a notice was attached that the buyer was obligated to only use 
unpatented stencil paper and ink made by the patent holder in the operation of the 
machine. The Supreme Court held that the patent (regarding the machine) was not 
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exhausted by the “first sale” because of the restriction placed on the buyer by the 
notice on the machine. Applying a rationale partly based on the implied license 
doctrine, the Court reasoned that where an unconditional first sale will transfer the 
patented object with an unrestricted implied license to use or dispose of the object, 
a conditional first sale (by means of an explicit restriction) limits the scope of the 
implied license and consequently the scope of exhausted rights.150 In addition, 
previous to this conclusion, the Court noted “[t]hat defendants might be sued upon 
the broken contract, or for its enforcement, or for the forfeiture of the license, is 
[…] plain.”151  
 
A.B. Dick was followed by other Supreme Court cases that distinguished and 
ultimately overruled it.152 In Motion Picture Patents, a patent holder limited the 
purchaser’s use of its film projectors to show only film made under a patent held by 
the same company. The Court noted that, “the primary purpose of our patent laws 
is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts’.”153 Finally, the Court recited the rule 
that, “the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the article sold 
being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of 
every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.”154 It was obvious to 
the Court that its conclusions were such that A.B. Dick had to be regarded as 
overruled (i.e. that restrictions could not be used to preserve patent rights).155 
Mid–1900s 
The Court’s most recent patent exhaustion case preceding Quanta, Univis Lens, was 
decided in 1942.156 Univis Lens Company held patents on bi–focal and tri–focal 
lenses and licensed others to perform certain segments of the patent procedure and 
thereafter to sell the products to other Univis licensees, and finally consumers, at 
set rates. Univis was charged with violating the Sherman Act (i.e. violating antitrust 
rules) by using price–fixing terms. Univis used its patent as an asserted defense to 
the suit. The Court adopted the same rationale for patent rights as Adams: “the 
purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the 
patentee has received his reward […] by the sale of the article.”157 The authorized 
sale of an object was a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the 
article sold. In the case that the article was not finished, the sale included an 
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implied license to finish the patent procedure, meaning that the patent holder 
could not preserve patent rights beyond the sale by selling unfinished lens blanks.158  
The 2000s 
It would be more than 60 years before the Supreme Court decided another patent 
exhaustion case. Univis Lens was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Quanta. LG 
Electronics (“LGE”) had bought a portfolio of patents of which it later included a 
number of them in a license to Intel Corporation (“Intel”). 159  The licensing 
arrangement between the parties was complex and included, as far as was relevant 
to the case, separate master and license agreements. The master agreement provided 
that Intel was to provide its buyers with a written notice that Intel’s license did not 
extend to products made “by combining an Intel product with any non–Intel 
product”. The master agreement also provided that a breach of it would not have 
any effect on – and would not be grounds to terminate – the license agreement. 160 
The license agreement authorized Intel to, “’make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), 
offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of its own products practicing the 
[licensed] patents” and included a clause stating that LGE and Intel would not 
grant licenses to third party buyers regarding combinations of licensed products 
with products not originating with either LGE or Intel. In addition, the license 
agreement stated that it was not intended to modify the effect of patent exhaustion. 
Quanta Computer (“Quanta”) bought products from Intel that it used by 
combining them with other (non–Intel) products in a manner that the 
combination exercised LGE patents, ignoring the written notice provided by Intel 
in accordance with the master agreement. LGE sued Quanta for infringement of 
the licensed patents, who in turn, defended the use by arguing that the patent 
rights in the products had been exhausted.  
 
The Supreme Court held that following an authorized first sale, post–sale 
restrictions on the use of the product cannot be enforced through a patent 
infringement suit. 161  While LGE argued that Intel was not authorized to sell 
products for use in combination with non–Intel products, the Court noted that the 
license agreement did not restrict Intel’s right to sell products to third parties that 
intended to combine them with non–Intel parts.162 Furthermore, the provision 
requiring notice to the buyers appeared only in the master agreement and even the 
breach of that agreement would not have challenged the validity of the license 
agreement. As a result, the Court found that the sale by Intel was authorized. LGE 
also argued that Quanta lacked a license to practice the patents, as stated in the 
license agreement, but the Court dismissed this argument by pointing to Quanta’s 
assertion of right to practice the patents being based on the doctrine of exhaustion 
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and not on an implied license. 163  Finally, the Court added a footnote to its 
judgment, noting that  
the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE’s 
other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not include a breach–of–contract 
claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be 
available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages.164 
In its outline of the history of the exhaustion doctrine, the Court referred to the 
rationale behind patents as put forth in the Constitution and further observed by 
the Motion Picture Patents case.165 Still referring to Motion Picture Patents, the Court 
cited the rule that “the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, 
the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and 
rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.”166 
 
The exhaustion doctrine has been upheld following Quanta in Bowman v. 
Monsanto,167 regarding patented soy beans whose planting had been restricted to 
only one growing season. The Court held that while the purchaser would be free to 
consume the beans himself, feed them to his animals or sell them, the exhaustion 
doctrine did not allow him to make new patented beans. This is what he did by 
planting the beans and harvesting them.168 The Court also emphasized the basis of 
the exhaustion doctrine as, “’[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with 
respect to any particular article when the patentee has received his reward … by the 
sale of the article’; once that ‘purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for 
restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.’”169 The Court added in 
footnote 3, that the exhaustion doctrine could not protect the purchaser in 
reproducing the beans, no matter where they were purchased (patent holder or 
other) and that the right to plant, harvest and market one crop followed from the 
license accompanying the beans.170 In the event that the patent holder would sell 
the beans without such a license, the Court was of the opinion that the purchaser 
might reasonably claim that the sale came with an implied license to plant and 
harvest one crop.171 
 
Quanta has received a lot of attention because of the specific facts in the case 
regarding the restrictions allegedly placed on Intel and subsequent buyers. The 
hope was that the Court would resolve the uncertainties of the compatibility of the 
first sale doctrine and the conditional sale doctrine arising from the Federal 
Circuits opinion in Mallinckrodt, described below. However, the Court did not 
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mention Mallinckrodt even in passing. Following Quanta, arguments have been 
made both for and against Mallinckrodt and the conditional sale doctrine still being 
good law. The principal arguments in that debate will be laid out following the 
presentation of the conditional sale doctrine.  
4.3.2 The Partial Bargain: The Conditional Sale Doctrine 
According to the conditional sale doctrine, a post–sale restriction placed in a sales 
agreement will preserve the IPR holder’s right to invoke patent rights against the 
buyer (or subsequent buyers).172 The doctrine is an alternative view of what satisfies 
the purpose of the federal patent statute of promoting innovation by allowing the 
patent holder to receive a reward for its invention. The idea is simply that the 
patent holder may make a partial bargain where the purchaser is restricted by 
contract because the patent holder retains some rights in the item in return for a 
lesser payment than the full value of the patent right.173  
 
The Federal Circuit has upheld post–sale restrictions as preserving patent rights in 
two cases. In Mallinckrodt, the patent holder owned a patent on a device used for 
the delivery of medicinal materials in the form of an aerosol mist for treatment and 
diagnosis of lung conditions. The company manufactured and sold devices to 
hospitals along with an attached notice and a package insert containing the 
statement that the device was for a single use only. Ignoring these notices, some 
hospitals sent their used devices to a reconditioning company that cleaned and 
returned the devices to the buyers for reuse. Mallinckrodt sued the reconditioning 
company for infringement and inducement to infringe.  
 
The Mallinckrodt court was of the opinion that not all restrictions on the use of 
patented goods are unenforceable and that the right to exclude may be waived in 
whole or in part.174 Furthermore, the enforceability of the restriction did not rely on 
the structure of the transaction and the Court declined to make a distinction 
between the purchaser acquiring the product from a manufacturing licensee or a 
manufacturing patentee.175 That opinion relies in part on General Talking Pictures as 
valid case law to form a base for the conclusion that exhaustion should not be 
dependent on the structure of the transaction, arguing that the parties should not 
be able to dispose of exhaustion simply through structuring the transaction.176 
Mallinckrodt also comments the case law on which the district court had relied as 
only establishing that price–fixing and tying restrictions are per se illegal but not 
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holding that all restrictions were illegal.177 It further argued that a patent owner 
“should not be in a worse position, by virtue of the patent right to exclude, than 
owners of other property used in trade.” 178  Accordingly, the conditional sale 
doctrine is limited to upholding restrictions that are “reasonably within the patent 
grant [without] having an anti–competitive effect not justifiable under the rule of 
reason.”179  
 
The Federal Circuit affirmed Mallinckrodt in Braun, also preceding Quanta. Braun 
had sold its products to another company for two types of uses, but explicitly 
excluded a third type of use that the parties instead continued to negotiate. The 
parties never reached agreement on the third use for the products and the buyer 
contracted with a third company to provide substitute products, which came to 
practice the patent that Braun owned. The Court recited that the exhaustion 
doctrine, “[did] not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a 
transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that 
reflects only the value of the ‘use’ rights conferred by the patentee.”180 
 
Mallinckrodt has been criticized for not clearly separating issues of restrictions placed 
on a purchaser when the seller is the patentee and when the seller is a 
manufacturing licensee.181 Restricting terms in general were not disputed, since 
there was consensus regarding the recognition of restricting terms in licenses.182  
Rather, the controversy over Mallinckrodt related to the enforceability of restricting 
terms in an agreement between a purchaser and a manufacturing patentee. While 
licenses are relations in which the parties have interests, a sale confers property 
rights on the purchaser. The license is in essence an authorization by the proprietor 
to do something that otherwise would be considered an infringing act and if the 
licensee performs an act that is not authorized by the license, it is infringing on the 
proprietor’s right.183 A sale, in contrast, is not such an authorization; it conveys 
property rights and the owner of the product need no further authorization to use 
it.184 
 
As noted above, Quanta did not mention Mallinckrodt at all. This is as expected, 
since the license agreement between LGE and Intel was found unconditional; the 
Court did not have a reason to address the conditional sale doctrine.185 Conversely, 
the fact that the Court did not consider the possibility of Quanta being bound by 
the notice given by Intel suggests that the authorized sale triggered exhaustion and 
that the restriction could not preserve patent rights. In respect to these arguments, 
one may well note the distinction between the seller’s capacity as authorized or not 
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and the enforceability of a condition in a sale by an authorized seller. Another view 
on Mallinckrodt’s standing as good law is that Quanta indeed held that exhaustion 
makes all post–sale restrictions unenforceable, at least under patent law, but that is 
was silent on the question whether restrictions would be enforceable under 
contract law, as in Mallinckrodt.186 
4.4 Enforceability of Restricting Contract 
Provisions in Contract Law 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Now, even though there are valid arguments to say that the conditional sale 
doctrine is still good law and not overruled by Quanta, it would still be a great risk 
to the patent holder to rely solely on this doctrine. One option is not to transfer 
ownership and instead license the distribution or use of the product. According to 
case law, an agreement that title does not pass will normally control the 
classification of the transaction.187 Also recall that the Quanta court opened a door 
for the possibility to recover contract remedies. In order to successfully sue and 
recover remedies based in contract law, the term in question has to be enforceable 
in contract law. In addition, as being regulated by state law, the contract is subject 
to federal laws such as antitrust rules, patent misuse rules and also intellectual 
property rules; see further description on federal preemption of state law below.  
4.4.2 Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy 
Contracts are regulated by state law and, consequently, there may be differences 
between the states regarding specific rules. With that in mind, for the purpose of 
this thesis, the contract law rule will be retrieved from the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.188 Under the Restatement, a contract clause may be unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy, § 178 
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in 
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms. 
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of 
(a) the parties’ justified expectations, 
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and 
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term. 
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of  
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial 
decisions, 
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that 
policy, 
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(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it 
was deliberate, and 
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the 
term. 
If the term is unenforceable due to public policy, it is generally considered void ab 
initio (the term may not be enforced upon either party’s election), as opposed to 
voidable (the term is unenforceable on election by a party).189  
 
With regards to the issue at hand, relevant policies are the public policies and 
objectives underlying patent law and the doctrine of exhaustion. The Supreme 
Court has held some contract terms unenforceable as interfering with patent law 
policy, such as a term where the buyer agrees to not challenge the validity of the 
patent because the term undermined the strong federal policy that invalid patents 
should not be enforced.190 Also, a term where the parties agreed that royalties would 
be paid under a license beyond the term of the patent was held unenforceable 
because it extended the term of the patent.191 Nevertheless, a term stating that 
royalties were to be paid for an unpatented invention was upheld where the Court 
found no conflict with specific patent law policy and also that the general goals of 
encouraging inventive activity and disclosure were furthered by the agreement.192  
 
The Patent Act includes a provision reciting the policy and objectives of patent law, 
35 U.S.C. § 200 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote 
the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or 
development; […] to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and 
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and 
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to 
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the 
United States by United States industry and labor; to […] protect the public 
against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions[…].193 
Recall that the patent exhaustion cases described previously have recited rationales 
and objectives for patent law and exhaustion of patent rights. Regarding patent law, 
the incentive–to–create is recited in the U.S. Constitution. In respect to exhaustion 
of patent rights, the principal arguments are that the reward received upon the 
product’s first sale fully gives the incentive to create (see for example Adams and 
Univis Lens) and that the circulation of goods should be promoted (see Adams). 
Quanta agreed with Univis Lens that the product moves outside the limits of the 
patent monopoly once it has been passed through an authorized first sale and the 
patent holder has been compensated for the relinquishment of rights.194 
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Public policies other than patent law policies that have rendered restricting contract 
terms unenforceable are the policies against restraints on alienation195 and against 
restraints of trade. In respect to vertical agreements, the impact of these policies has 
shifted from holding vertical restraints as per se prohibited, to assess them on a 
case–by–case basis under the rule of reason.196  
4.4.3 Unenforceable by Law 
Federal Preemption of State Law 
Apart from a term’s enforceability under contract law, contract law’s nature as state 
law also makes the enforceability of the term subject to the supremacy clause in the 
U.S. Constitution: Article VI, second paragraph: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Courts apply three types of federal preemption of state law: (i) explicit preemption, 
(ii) field preemption (where federal law preoccupies the entire field) and (iii) 
conflict preemption, if (a) it would be impossible to comply with both federal and 
state law, or (b) state law stands in the way of accomplishment of the objectives of 
the federal law.197 Patent law does not expressly preempt state law but the objectives 
of patent law have preempted conflicting state law according to the type of 
preemption under (iii) (b).198 As an example, the Supreme Court has found in a line 
of cases that when a product is in the public domain, state law granting exclusive 
rights in the product is preempted.199  
 
The very purpose of a post–sale restriction is to preserve a measure of control for 
the benefit of the patent holder, despite the product having been taken outside the 
limits of the patent monopoly. 200  Accordingly, the restriction, if viewed as 
frustrating or interfering with patent law objective as reflected by the doctrine of 
exhaustion would be unenforceable; alternatively, if the removal of access to patent 
remedies through the exhaustion of patent rights is enough to meet the objectives 
of patent law, the restriction could be enforceable.201 
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Antitrust 
The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits anti–competitive conduct and results. 202 
However, a patent holder acting within the limits of the patent monopoly is not 
subject to antitrust rules, as actions within the patent monopoly are the exercise of 
rights granted by federal (patent) law and supported by federal policy favoring the 
incentivizing of innovation. The Sherman Act prohibits some practices as per se 
anti–competitive, while others are scrutinized under a rule of reason, asking 
whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses market competition.203 
Although possession of a patent does not give rise to a presumption of market 
power, an agreement made by a patent holder with market power or, for example, 
the practice of cross–licensing to control a market, may trigger antitrust laws. 204 A 
safe harbor is offered in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) for certain practices but does not 
provide patentees general immunity from antitrust laws. 205  Some examples of 
contract terms in violation of antitrust laws are: price–discrimination, ”tying” 
clauses, bad–faith claims of infringement and fraud in obtaining patent rights.206  
Patent Misuse 
Patent misuse is a doctrine separate from antitrust law and does not require 
showing an antitrust violation. 207  It is an affirmative defense to a patent 
infringement claim and is applicable where the patent holder uses practices that 
effectively broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant, with anti–
competitive effect.208 The patent is then unenforceable until the misuse ends and its 
consequences are dissipated.209 Examples of terms held as attempts to broaden the 
scope of the patent are the tying clause in Motion Picture Patents and a royalty clause 
demanding the payment of royalties beyond the expiration of the patent term.210  
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5 Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, I sought answers to two questions: (1) 
whether the proprietor may control when exhaustion occurs by use of post–sale 
restrictions and (2) if the post–sale restrictions will secure control through contract 
over objects incorporating the IPR after they have been sold. As to whether post–
sale restrictions would affect the occurrence of exhaustion, I have laid out the 
elements of exhaustion to see what they are and how they are evaluated. The 
development in the EU is mostly uniform while the U.S. view on post–sale 
restrictions’ effect on exhaustion can be said to have two alternatives offering 
different solutions. In the case that restrictions do not affect the occurrence of 
exhaustion, the question arises whether they are enforceable under contract law 
and thereby would offer the proprietor recourse. In any case, a law and economics 
perspective on these questions is motivated by the legal system surrounding IPRs 
being fundamental and closely linked to economic efficiency in market economies, 
as it establishes possibilities for the proprietor to recoup investments and also 
promotes the dissemination and trade of objects incorporating IPRs.  
 
My reflections are divided into four topics. I will begin by presenting my concluding 
remarks on the EU and U.S. chapters and then continue with reflections on the 
U.S. views from an EU perspective before I critically assess the EU regulation from 
an economic efficiency perspective. 
5.2 Concluding Remarks on the EU Chapter 
5.2.1 The Exhaustion Doctrine 
The negative effects of national IPRs on fundamental EU principles and the 
express EU undertaking of creating an internal market with free movement of 
goods were soon recognized and early CJEU case law, consequently, limits the 
exercise of national IPRs. Today, IPRs have become important instruments for the 
EU to further technological development and the doctrine of exhaustion serves as 
an aid to perfect competition on the internal market. The establishment of the 
internal market is supported by EU competition law and the principle of free 
movement of goods and these are the primary rules underlying the exhaustion 
doctrine, balancing the exercise of IPRs.  
 
The exhaustion doctrine is expressed as prohibiting the proprietor to invoke IPRs 
in respect to goods put on the market by the proprietor or with his consent. While 
several alternative interpretations of the elements of the doctrine have been argued 
and suggested, the closer meaning of the rule has been laid out in case law, as the 
CJEU has interpreted the different elements. In respect to the definition of goods, 
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the CJEU interpreted the Trademark Directive in Sebago and held that exhaustion 
only is effective in respect to individual items. The goods then have to be put on the 
market and the CJEU stated in Peak Holding that the interpretation in this respect 
has to be uniform in the Community legal order. Furthermore, the interpretation 
of the required act is that exhaustion is triggered by a sale through which the right 
holder can realize the economic value of the IPR. An offer to sell is not sufficient to 
satisfy the element, as this does not transfer the right to dispose of the good 
(bearing the trademark) to the buyer and it does not allow the proprietor to recover 
its reward (the economic value of the trademark). The rationale behind the CJEU’s 
reasoning was that trademark law should contribute to undistorted competition.  
 
The CJEU defined the relevant territory in Silhouette as the EEA and also stated 
that an interpretation where member states could provide exhaustion rules 
regarding acts outside the relevant territory would be contrary to the wording, 
scheme and purpose of the Trademark Directive. The solution chosen, with 
complete harmonization of the rules relating to the rights conferred, was the only 
solution capable of fully ensuring that the purpose of the Trademark Directive is 
achieved, to safeguard the functioning of the internal market. Exhaustion occurs if 
the goods have been put on the market by the proprietor or with his consent; if it is 
done by the proprietor or someone sufficiently linked to the proprietor, the CJEU 
will not evaluate whether there is consent. The relationship with the proprietor 
substitutes for consent. Compulsory licenses are excluded, as it has to be a 
voluntary disposition.  
 
The act of putting the goods on the market, if it is not the proprietor or someone 
sufficiently linked to him, has to be with the proprietor’s consent. Consent is to be 
given a uniform interpretation in the EU according to Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss 
and it has to be given for individual objects, according to Sebago. The reason for 
consent to have a uniform interpretation is that, if it did not have a uniform 
interpretation (but would be judged according to national law), the protection of 
IPRs could vary throughout the Community. Consent may, according to Zino 
Davidoff & Levi Strauss, be express or implied but not inferred from the proprietor’s 
silence. Consent can be found previous to, simultaneously or after the goods has 
been put on the market. Implied consent is precluded if the proprietor has applied 
express restrictions. Conclusively, we have deduced a rule of exhaustion prohibiting 
the proprietor to invoke IPRs in respect of an individual object, sold within the 
EEA, by the proprietor or someone linked to him, or with his express or implied 
consent.  
 
I would like to make some comments on the CJEU’s judgment in Peak Holding. The 
judgment could be interpreted as that: if the bar for satisfaction of the put on the 
market element would be set at “merely” an offer to sell, it would be harmful to 
competition in the manner that competitors may dispose of the goods without the 
proprietor having realized its rewards. This judgment (or others, also decided 
regarding the Trademark Directive) could be argued as being specific for trademark 
law, and if they are, the development in patent law may look quite different. The 
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specific subject matter of trademark is that the proprietor is in control over the 
quality of the goods and their putting on the market and the specific subject matter 
of patents is that the proprietor has the exclusive right to first put the good on the 
market. The difference lies in the possibility of the trademark holder to restrict free 
movement of the goods in order to secure their quality. A patent holder does not 
have the same leverage and a patent exhaustion case may not warrant an equally 
strict judgment from the CJEU. However, if the CJEU focuses on its reasoning 
behind not finding offer for sale as sufficient in trademark cases – i.e. the “transfer 
to third parties [of] the right to dispose of the goods” is part of triggering 
exhaustion, and that an offer would “not [be] allow[ing] the proprietor to realize the 
economic value” – it seems reasonable that these arguments could be applied to 
patent law as well. An observation is that it seems farfetched that the CJEU would 
evaluate, in fact, if the proprietor has received his reward. A more reasonable 
assumption would be that it is the possibility to realize the rewards that is the right 
criteria. 
 
The question of to whom the sale has to be made to satisfy the element has not 
been addressed by the CJEU but some alternatives have been suggested. I would 
like to change the perspective, and ask instead: when is it not a sale satisfying the 
element, i.e. when are restrictions enforceable because exhaustion has not 
occurred? I argue that the answer lies in the relationships that satisfy the element of 
consent. A sale to a buyer, whose further commercialization of the goods would 
exhaust IPRs due to the buyer’s link to the proprietor, should not exhaust the IPRs. 
In reverse, a sale to a buyer who is not linked to the proprietor in such a way – a 
third party – who instead would require the proprietor’s consent to further 
commercialize the goods, should exhaust the IPRs. In this manner, the different 
elements of the rule are consistent and also, in my opinion, in alignment with 
competition law. A sale to a third party should reasonably exhaust the IPRs, 
otherwise the proprietor would be able to control large sections of the market by 
means of its IPR.  
 
Most of the elements of exhaustion are questions of fact, objectively decided. The 
elements that a proprietor might argue to avoid exhaustion in a case where 
restrictions have been used, are (1) that it is not a sale but instead a license, (2) that 
there are no sufficient links to the proprietor and (3) that there is no consent. I will 
not discuss option (1) (Restrictions between the proprietor and a party that is 
sufficiently linked to him are not of relevance for this thesis unless it is argued that 
a sale between the parties would trigger exhaustion and I do not argue that this is 
the case.) but options (2) and (3) are of main concern. The proprietor could argue 
that there are no sufficient links to him and if he succeeds in proving that, the 
other party would, as a third party, have to prove that the proprietor has consented 
to the further commercialization of the goods (within the EEA). Consent is only at 
issue when it is a third party without links to the proprietor that is commercializing 
the goods. As we have seen in the line of cases that have laid out the elements of 
exhaustion, there is a difference between consent in the negative (negating consent by 
the use of restrictions) and consent in the positive (expressing consent). Naturally, 
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consent in the positive will satisfy the element. Consent in the negative will, 
however, only preclude a finding of implied consent (see Coty Prestige). As a result, 
my conclusion is that the proprietor cannot control when exhaustion occurs 
through the use of post–sale restrictions, other than avoiding a finding of implied 
consent.  
5.2.2 The Enforceability of Post–Sale Restrictions in Contract 
Law 
Post–sale restrictions may still preserve some measure of control for the proprietor 
even if they do not preserve IPRs, by deterring the buyer from unwanted behavior 
by threat of being charged with breach of contract. There is no sign that restrictions 
are invalid between the parties, unless they are anti–competitive or against the 
principle of free movement. Such a restriction, even if only enforced by contract 
law, is by nature attempting to preserve rights similar to IPRs. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the main threats against its enforceability are the same rules that have 
limited the exercise of IPRs, namely the principle of free movement and 
competition law. Normally, if the restriction is challenged as restricting the free 
movement of goods, the proprietor would argue that the restriction of free 
movement is warranted to protect the specific subject matter of the IPR. 
Nevertheless, the chances of succeeding with such an argument – when the IPR has 
been exhausted and the issue is exclusively contractual – are in my opinion slight. 
Consequently, the IPR holder is bound by the same rule of free movement as any 
other proprietary passing title in an object.  
 
In regards to competition law, the restriction will be judged under two provisions: 
the rule prohibiting agreements that prevent, restrict or distort competition 
between member states and the rule prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position. 
The prohibition on anti–competitive agreements is only applicable if the anti–
competitive effect is between member states. That effect may vary depending on the 
type of the restriction. A territorial restriction, where the buyer is prohibited to 
further commercialize goods into certain other member states, would be at risk of 
violating the provision. Other restrictions may not be as at risk: for example field–
of use restrictions. An agreement that otherwise prevents, restricts or distorts 
competition may escape application of competition rules by the exemption that 
allows for agreements that improve production or distribution of goods or that 
promote technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit. Two block exemptions clarify this exemption and provide for 
safe harbors for agreements that are anti–competitive but have an overall effect of 
such a nature that they are exempt: the TTBER and the VRR. The TTBER is not of 
interest here since IPRs are not exhausted under license agreements and the 
TTBER is concerned with licenses. As a result, it is not of any help to the 
proprietor in the issue at hand. The VRR could offer recourse but is only applicable 
in vertical agreements. It is only applicable on IP licenses if the licensing is ancillary 
to the “actual” agreement. Again, as we are not concerned with an IP license, this is 
not an issue. With regard to the provision prohibiting abuse of a dominant 
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position, a proprietor of an IPR is on level with other, non–IPR holding, dominant 
position holders in this case. The IPR has been exhausted and any restrictions in 
the contract will be judged independently and with the dominant position in mind.  
 
Conclusively, a post–sale restriction imposed by contract with the intent to preserve 
some measure of control for the proprietor by deterring the buyer by threat of 
being charged with breach of contract, will not have any advantage of the exhausted 
IPR. However, if the agreement instead is vertical and the primary object of it is not 
the licensing of an IPR, the VRR could exempt the agreement from being struck 
down as anti–competitive. The fact that the agreement containing the restriction is 
regarding an object incorporating the IPR has no bearing on the evaluation on 
whether a proprietor has abused his dominant market position.  
5.3 Concluding Remarks on the U.S. Chapter 
5.3.1 The First Sale Doctrine 
In the U.S., the doctrine of exhaustion, referred to as the “first sale” doctrine, has 
developed in case law. Recently, in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first 
patent exhaustion case since 1942, Quanta. The Quanta court stated that the initial 
authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. Two 
underlying rationales have been pointed out to motivate the “first sale” doctrine: 
(1) the sale of the object embodying the patent includes an implied license and (2) 
the (new) owner of the object has a proprietary right to use it and a restriction 
would be an unjustified restriction on alienation. The cases leading up to Quanta 
have been mostly uniform: McQuewan held that a sale passes the object outside the 
patent monopoly and Adams followed by holding that the sale conferred upon the 
purchaser the right to use the object for the purpose that all such objects were used 
and that when the patentee receives full royalty in the sale, the object is open to the 
purchaser’s use without further restriction on account of patent monopoly. For a 
brief moment, a restriction preserved patent rights because it was in fact a limited 
implied license according to A.B Dick but Motion Picture Patents overruled the 
permissive decision towards restrictions in A.B. Dick and held that the right to vend 
is exhausted by a single unconditional sale. The purpose of patent law is to promote 
progress of science and art and, accordingly, to reward the patentee for his 
invention. Aside from A.B. Dick, the Supreme Court seems to have been, through 
time, unanimous in its decisions; following a passing of title to an object 
embodying a patent, the patentee may not invoke his rights to prevent the buyer 
from disposing of the object.  
5.3.2 The Conditional Sale Doctrine 
The lower court, the Federal Circuit, argues that it is not bound to follow all the 
Supreme Court cases and instead reasons that there also is room for another view 
on post–sale restrictions. It has upheld post–sale restrictions in two cases, 
Mallinckrodt and Braun, holding that not all restrictions are unenforceable but that 
some restrictions preserve patent rights for the patentee. The rationale was that the 
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proprietor may renounce his rights in whole or in part and that a partial bargain, 
made for only part of the patent rights, is enforceable because it puts a limit on the 
implied license granted to the purchaser. The Federal Circuit recognized that 
restrictions such as price–fixing and tying clauses were prohibited per se but 
reasoned that other restrictions should be evaluated just as any other provisions in 
a contract. The clause will be effective in preserving patent rights if it is valid 
between the parties. 
 
The standing of Mallinckrodt and Braun as good law following the Quanta decision 
by the Supreme Court has been debated. As the Quanta court explicitly held that 
the license agreement between LGE and Intel was not restricted, the arguments 
made that Quanta did not decide upon an issue of a conditional sale are 
reasonable. However, this would not resolve questions about the fact that the 
restriction was placed by Intel, and not LGE, on Quanta. In any case, Quanta did 
not mention either Mallinckrodt or Braun and it would be bold to argue that they 
are overruled, despite them being omitted in the judgment. It would be more 
reasonable to argue that Quanta simply did not express any opinion on these cases 
from the Federal Circuit.  
 
At this point, I would like to pick up on the earlier comment that a difference 
should be made in the distinction between the seller’s capacity as authorized or not 
and the enforceability of a condition in a sale by an authorized seller. As noted in 
the chapter on the conditional sale doctrine, the controversy of Mallinckrodt was not 
whether restrictions could be used or not, as they are recognized in license 
agreements (recall General Talking Pictures) as having the effect that the licensee 
cannot convey to the buyer what both knew the licensee was not authorized to sell; 
but, the controversy of Mallinckrodt regarded the enforceability of a restriction 
placed in an agreement by an authorized seller. My interpretation of this, together 
with other case law, is that a restriction placed in a sales agreement by an 
authorized seller intends to affect the exhaustion of patent rights while a restriction 
in the license agreement is intended to affect the authority of the licensee. 
Mallinckrodt approves of both uses. Applied on Quanta, there was indeed reason for 
the Court to address the doctrine of conditional sale because the licensee was 
authorized to make the sale and the question was actually if the authorized seller 
could insert a restriction that would preserve patent rights. The issue remains 
unaddressed.  
 
The lower courts may, if similar cases are filed, choose to argue that the Supreme 
Court in fact did overrule Mallinckrodt; or they could choose to follow the Federal 
Circuit precedent. Another argument that these courts may use is that they cannot 
follow the rule put forth in Mallinckrodt because it is the same rule that was stated 
in A.B. Dick, which was overruled in Motion Picture Patents. In A.B. Dick, the 
Supreme Court stated that where an unconditional first sale will transfer the 
patented object with an unrestricted implied license to use or dispose of the object, 
a conditional first sale (by means of an express restriction) limits the scope of the 
implied license and consequently the scope of exhausted rights. Similarly, 
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Mallinckrodt stated that the right to exclude may be waived in whole or in part and 
upheld the restriction as neither per se unenforceable, nor unenforceable for other 
reasons, and accordingly enforceable as preserving patent rights. Because the rules 
put forth in A.B. Dick and Mallinckrodt are similar (some would argue that they are 
identical), an argument can be made that Motion Picture Patents, as standing 
Supreme Court precedent, and overruling A.B. Dick, also invalidates the rule stated 
by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt. When the Federal Circuit decides a case 
upon appeal, it is likely to follow its own precedent and uphold Mallinckrodt and 
the conditional sale doctrine. Conclusively, it does in fact look like there are two 
parallel doctrines regarding exhaustion of patent rights in the U.S. currently, and 
that the Supreme Court, for some reason, declined to address the compatibility of 
them within the framework of the fact pattern present in Quanta. The application 
of either doctrine in the lower courts will depend upon what set of arguments the 
court is inclined to side with. 
5.3.3 Enforceability of Post–Sale Restrictions in Contract Law 
The restriction may, even though it does not preserve patent rights, be enforceable 
in contract law and serve the patent holder as a second option of recourse. There 
are several grounds of unenforceability that a contract drafter has to regard. Patent 
misuse is an affirmative defense that the buyer may argue in a patent infringement 
claim, meaning that the proprietor has extended the physical or temporal scope of 
the patent (by contract) with an anti–competitive effect. Patent misuse does not 
require a showing of a violation of antitrust law, as it is an independent doctrine. 
However, antitrust is similar in the manner that the patent holder for the most part 
is “safe” as long as he acts within the grant of the patent and that he may be at risk 
to violate antitrust rules if he ventures outside of the grant by preserving patent–
like control through restrictions. Indeed, some restrictions are prohibited per se, 
such as price–fixing or tying clauses; while others are judged according to the rule 
of reason, asking whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses market 
competition.  
 
A judgment of a term under antitrust rules requires that the scope of the patent 
grant is known. The express scope of the patent grant is found in law, where the 
rights conferred are found and an argument that the scope extends further would 
have to be supported by the objectives of patent law. The exact scope of the patent 
grant is also relevant in respect to federal preemption of state (contract) law. As we 
have seen in case law and in the Patent Act, the objective of U.S. patent law is to 
promote progress in science and the useful arts and that accordingly, the right 
should secure that the proprietor receives his reward for his invention by the first 
sale of objects embodying the patent. The exhaustion doctrine then acts as a 
balancing act, allowing for the dissemination of objects after the proprietor has 
received his reward for that object. As we may deduce that the very purpose of a 
post–sale restriction is to preserve control to the benefit of the patent holder 
beyond the limits of the patent monopoly, the question we need to answer is 
whether the removal of patent remedies by exhaustion of patent rights is enough to 
satisfy the objective of patent law. I would argue that the removal of patent 
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remedies by exhaustion of patent rights is in fact enough to satisfy the objective of 
patent law, and that a restriction otherwise enforceable under contract law should 
not be preempted by federal law as against the objectives of patent law.  
5.4 Comparison 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Both the EU and the U.S. are advanced, developed, market economies with all 
possibilities present to drive technological development forward. The two main 
points that I would like to discuss following the conclusions on their separate 
chapters are: (1) that U.S. law has an alternative reasoning behind the exhaustion 
doctrine that allows for limitation of exhaustion, and (2) that there is a difference 
between the two jurisdictions regarding their treatment of exhaustion upon a sale 
by a licensee.  
5.4.2 An Alternative Rationale to the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
As noted in the conclusion on the U.S. chapter, it does in fact look like there are 
two parallel doctrines regarding exhaustion of patent rights in the U.S. at the 
moment. While the one is similar to the EU rationale – that following the 
proprietor receiving his reward, the IPR cannot be invoked to control the object – 
the other is not. The alternative U.S. rationale is that the right for the buyer to use 
the object is given by an implied license included in the sale and that accordingly, 
the proprietor may control the scope of that license by express contract.  
 
The CJEU has held that the element of consent should be given a uniform 
interpretation and should accordingly be open to be give the term whatever content 
is necessary based on its own merits in an EU perspective. In theory, the CJEU 
would then be free to allow for an implied license reasoning. Per my analysis, 
however, it is unlikely that this reasoning would be recognized by the CJEU. Recall 
the case Zino Davidoff, where Judge Laddie found, by construing consent according 
to national law, that the buyer is unrestricted in his disposition of the goods unless 
restricted by contract. The CJEU answered the referred questions by holding that 
implied consent may not be inferred from the mere silence of the proprietor and it 
may not be inferred from: (i) the fact that the proprietor fails to communicate their 
opposition against subsequent marketing within the EEA, (ii) that the goods are 
not marked with a warning that prohibits their placing on the market within the 
EEA, (iii) that title has been transferred without restriction and that in such 
absence of restrictions, the governing law of the contract includes at least a right to 
market the goods subsequently within the EEA. Conclusively, a rationale for 
exhaustion based on implied license cannot be found at the present in the EU and 
is not likely to be recognized by it, even if would be argued.  
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5.4.3 Exhaustion’s Dependency of the Transaction’s Structure 
The second comparative point I would like to discuss is a difference between the 
two jurisdictions regarding their treatment of exhaustion upon a sale by a licensee. 
In the U.S., there is standing precedent that holds restrictions in a licensing 
agreement as enforceable against third parties. The Supreme Court held, in General 
Talking Pictures, that the licensee could not convey to the buyer what both knew it 
was not authorized to sell. Accordingly, the IPRs were not exhausted because the 
licensee had not made an authorized sale. In contrast, the rule under EU law is that 
the sale by a licensee, as a party sufficiently linked to the proprietor, exhausts IPRs 
without evaluating whether there is consent. The issue of the proprietor’s consent is 
only a factor when it is a third party making the sale. The U.S. perspective was 
criticized by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt, as it pointed out that exhaustion 
should not be dependent on the structure of the transaction –sale by a proprietor as 
opposed to sale by a manufacturing licensee – also arguing that the parties should 
not be able to dispose of exhaustion simply through structuring the transaction. 
This is a valid point, and I believe that the EU model is better balanced as a 
licensee, by its relationship with the proprietor, makes exhausting sales. This will 
prevent the use of intermediary manufacturing licensees to contract around the 
exhaustion doctrine.  
 
A possible reason to this difference is the jurisdiction’s view on agent law. A 
licensee has a legal authority (legal capacity) and the proprietor may give the 
licensee terms of reference that limits what actions the licensee is allowed to take. 
The difference between the two boundaries – the legal authority and the terms of 
reference – is their effect in respect of third parties. While an act taken by the 
licensee within the legal authority but outside the terms of reference cannot be 
challenged by the proprietor but the licensee may be liable for breach of contract, 
an act taken outside of both the legal authority and the terms of reference can be 
challenged by the proprietor and also make the licensee liable for breach of 
contract. Applied to the two different views on exhaustion upon a sale by a licensee 
in the EU and the U.S., it may be argued that, the terms of the license agreement 
in the EU are terms of reference rather than the boundaries of the legal authority, 
while in the U.S. the terms decide the boundaries of the licensee’s legal authority. I 
find the EU view more reasonable, as it will promote foreseeability for third parties 
outside of the license agreement and, as a result, trade in those objects. The 
limitations put on the licensee are by agreement and only of interest between the 
contracting parties. Accordingly, the proprietor should be limited to recover breach 
of contract remedies from the licensee rather than being able to invoke IPRs against 
the third party buyer.  
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5.5 Economic Efficiency 
5.5.1 Intellectual Property Rights and the Dynamic Economic 
Efficiency Theory 
The economic method assumes a state of general equilibrium where the benefit to 
society is greatest; supply and demand meet where the marginal cost for producing 
the last unit is equal to the price that a consumer is willing to pay for it. General 
equilibrium is the market model for the static efficiency theory and it builds on 
utility–maximizing consumers and profit–maximizing companies acting in a market 
where competitive forces lead to the equality of marginal benefit and marginal cost. 
Perfect competition on the market is essential for general equilibrium and anything 
that prevents perfect competition is called a market failure. Market failures may 
come in different forms, monopoly and market power being one. This is the reason 
why IPRs do not easily fit into the static efficiency market model; they grant the 
owner a monopoly–like position on the market by law, which is exactly the kind of 
market failure that the legal system normally plays a large role in removing. Under 
the dynamic efficiency theory, however, IPRs fit more readily in. The theory does not 
have a clear market model like the static efficiency theory and it rests on more 
factors, such as pricing, supply and demand as well as the generation of and 
competition by new technology. In contrast to the static efficiency theory, the 
dynamic efficiency theory accepts some inefficiencies in competition if they are due 
to the promotion of technological development as this has the potential to and 
often outweighs the benefit of perfect competition. Accordingly, IPRs are not only 
market failures under the dynamic efficiency theory but also beneficial to the 
market. However, it is critical to the efficiency of the market that a balance is struck 
where the benefits of IPRs outweigh their negative effects on the market.  
 
Despite that IPRs are actual property rights whose grant and existence lies 
exclusively with the EU’s member states, they are recognized as important 
instruments to the market by the EU. The creation of the internal market is a 
fundamental goal of the EU and can be seen as an ambition to create a state of 
general equilibrium. The internal market shall be free of internal borders, 
promoting free movement in several categories and provide for free competition. 
Stress has been placed by the EU’s institutions on the creation of an economy 
based on knowledge and innovation and it is seen as essential to the single market 
and in making the “fifth freedom”, the free movement of knowledge, that there is a 
clear regime for IPRs. I agree that it is essential that the regime is clear and 
foreseeable, as any uncertainties would cause the market actors to approach their 
transactions with more caution and result in a rise of transaction costs.  
5.5.2 Effects of Intellectual Property Rights on the Market 
Applying the dynamic efficiency theory on IPRs, they are beneficial to the market as 
they will contribute to technological development and competition. However, if the 
protection is too strong, the negative effects of IPRs as market failures may 
outweigh the benefits they bring. The same could be argued regarding too weak 
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protection: the incentive to invest in research and development would not be 
enough to render the level of technological development that would benefit the 
market enough to outweigh the negative effects of IPRs as market failures. The 
grant of an IPR is not absolute: it is subject to certain conditions and is, aside from 
the doctrine of exhaustion, also limited in time (certain exceptions apply to 
trademarks), by territory and scope of protection. In that manner, consideration 
has been made of their negative effects on the market. The exhaustion doctrine 
then operates as a balancing instrument, allowing the proprietor to recoup his 
investments (the incentive to create) and preventing him from unnecessarily 
keeping the products from being freely traded on the market.  
5.5.3 Post–Sale Restrictions’ Effects on Exhaustion as an 
Efficiency–Balancing Instrument 
Deciding the content of the exhaustion doctrine is a balancing act, where the 
question is how far the goods should be allowed to penetrate the market structure 
before they become free of the proprietor’s control. Exhaustion has to occur late 
enough for the proprietor to receive his rewards, any sooner and he will not have 
the incentive to create. Conversely, exhaustion has to occur soon enough that the 
goods are not burdened by the proprietor’s exercise of control when they instead 
should be freely traded on the market. Assuming that balance is struck and 
exhaustion occurs at a time most beneficial to the economic efficiency of the 
market, post–sale restrictions, if preserving IPRs, would disturb that balance. The 
only reason from an economic efficiency perspective to allow post–sale restrictions 
to affect exhaustion and preserve IPRs would be if the exhaustion doctrine does not 
promote economic efficiency in an optimal way; then, the post–sale restrictions 
could “correct” this inefficiency by setting the point of exhaustion at a more 
optimal point in time.  
 
I argue that balance should be found as early in the process as possible, preferably 
by the exhaustion doctrine. Consequently, I argue that economic efficiency would 
not be promoted if post–sale restrictions would be allowed to preserve IPRs. In 
contrast, my analysis regarding these restrictions in contract law is that economic 
efficiency would not benefit from a stricter approach against such a contract. 
Outside IP law, there is a working system in place for all contracts, no matter if the 
subject matter relates to objects incorporating IPRs. To apply stricter rules to a 
contract relating to objects incorporating IPRs would have no purpose and would 
affect all – not only the proprietor – who would trade in such objects. After the IPR 
is exhausted, the owner (IPR holder or not) of the object has to play by the same 
trading rules as for all other merchandise. As a result, I find no benefit to economic 
efficiency if post–sale restrictions in a contract regarding an object incorporating an 
IPR would be prohibited only for the reason that it regards such an object.  
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5.6 Final Conclusions 
This thesis analyzes two different legal systems in respect to IPR exhaustion and the 
effect on exhaustion by post–sale restrictions. The conclusions drawn from the EU 
and U.S. chapters identify the elements of exhaustion, so as to predict how the 
proprietor may argue that one or more elements have not been satisfied. Post–sale 
restrictions’ enforceability in contract law has also been outlined under both 
headlines. In short, the proprietor may not – neither in the EU, nor in the U.S. – 
control when exhaustion occurs by the use of post–sale restrictions, unless 
permitted in the U.S. by the conditional sale doctrine. Apart from this odd bird 
challenging the established rationale of U.S. patent exhaustion, both systems 
appear to be working towards the same goal by the same means. The enforceability 
in contract law of post–sale restrictions is independent of the object incorporating 
an IPR and the drafter has to observe the same boundaries of unenforceability as 
for other agreements, although restrictions preserving patent–like protection in the 
U.S. are at risk to be held unenforceable by federal preemption of state law.  
 
The two main points discussed in the comparison between the two systems are: (1) 
that U.S. law has an alternative reasoning behind the exhaustion doctrine that 
allows for limitation of exhaustion, and (2) that there is a difference between the 
two jurisdictions regarding their treatment of exhaustion upon a sale by a licensee. I 
conclude that a rationale for exhaustion based on implied license cannot be found 
at the present in and is not likely to be recognized by the EU, even if it would be 
argued. Regarding the difference in a licensee’s ability to make an exhausting sale in 
violation of restrictions placed upon it by the proprietor, U.S. law holds the 
restrictions enforceable in IP law where EU law does not.  
 
Finally, from an economic efficiency perspective, it is critical that a balance is struck 
where the benefits of IPRs outweigh their negative effects on the market. Assuming 
that balance is struck by exhaustion occurring at a time most beneficial to the 
economic efficiency of the market, post–sale restrictions – if preserving IPRs – 
would disturb that balance. In contrast, I find no benefit to economic efficiency if 
post–sale restrictions in a contract regarding an object incorporating an IPR would 
be unenforceable in contract law only for the reason that it regards such an object. 
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